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DEFAMATION IN THE EMPLOYMENT
DISCHARGE CONTEXT: THE EMERGING
DOCTRINE OF COMPELLED SELFPUBLICATION
Arlen W. Langvardt*
As if to affirm the notion that a favorable reputation is the "purest
treasure mortal times afford," 1 plaintiffs in recent years have demonstrated what seems an increasing inclination to resort to defamation
litigation. 2 In deciding to seek suitable compensation3 for a defendant's having tarnished their "purest treasure, ' 4 they appear not to

*
Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University Graduate School
of Business; B.A. 1976, Hastings College; J.D. 1981, with distinction, University of
Nebraska.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD II, act I, scene i, line 177. Once
such treasure (a "spotless reputation") is taken away from its former possessor, he
is "but gilded loam or painted clay." Id. lines 178-79.
2. See Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1983). See also Epstein, Was New York
Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 782, 783 (1986) (noting that in
recent years there has been an "onslaught of defamation actions that is greater in
number and severity" than it was prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), the case in which the Supreme Court first held that constitutional
considerations must play a role in defamation law).
3. Of course, an award of money damages is the traditional form of
compensation granted to the successful plaintiff in a defamation action. Depending
upon the evidence and the applicable legal rules, such compensation may take the
form of special damages, presumed damages, or punitive damages. See infra text
accompanying notes 38-44 and infra note 26. Many plaintiffs, however, may be
more strongly interested in having the defendant's statements about them determined
to be false than in the amount of damages they ultimately recover. See Soloski,
The Study and the Libel Plaintiff: Who Sues For Libel?, 71 IowA L. REV. 217, 220
(1985). Because a determination of falsity may be ample "compensation" for such
plaintiffs, recently there have been suggestions to the effect that states should create
a statutory action for determination of falsity, with less rigorous proof requirements
imposed on the plaintiff in such an action, than are mandated in a full-fledged
defamation suit. See, e.g., Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to Current
Libel Law, 74 CAur. L. REV. 809 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 768 n.2, 772 n.3 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
4. Besides comparing a good reputation to a treasure and noting the effect
of the loss of such treasure, see supra note 1, Shakespeare elsewhere wrote similarly
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have been deterred significantly by defamation law's increasingly
complex5 and, in the view of some commentators, nonsensical 6 nature.

concerning the importance of a favorable reputation:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, Is the immediate jewel of
their souls: Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; But he that filches
from me my good name robs me of that which not enriches him and makes
me poor indeed.
W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO,THE MOOR OF VENICE, act III, scene iii, lines
159-65. For a careful analysis of the nature of the reputational interests asserted by
plaintiffs in defamation actions, see Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. Rnv. 691 (1986).
5. Much of the increased complexity in the law of defamation has developed
since the Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
began to explore the extent to which first amendment considerations must supplement
the common law of defamation. It now is clear that the constitutional aspects of
defamation law require proof of different degrees of fault, depending upon the
status of the plaintiff and the sorts of damages sought. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
In addition, recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the degree of fault to be
proved, the burden of proving falsity, and the sorts of damages recoverable depend
to some extent upon whether the defendant's statement pertained to a matter of
public concern. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558 (1986);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). The
defendant's media or nonmedia status may also be part of the constitutional calculus
with regard to the issues just mentioned, but the Court's true position on the medianonmedia matter is uncertain. Compare Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, with Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749. For further discussion of the constitutional aspects of
defamation law, see infra notes 24-28. Although it would seem logical to believe
that plaintiffs would be deterred from pursuing defamation claims because the first
amendment-mandated proof requirements escalate the plaintiff's burden of proof
beyond what the common law required, such has not been the case. See Epstein,
supra note 2, at 783-84.
The common law of defamation has its own complexities and technicalities,
such as the general rule that presumed damages are available in libel actions (subject
to constitutional standards and limitations) but are not available in slander actions
unless slander per se is involved. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0. GRAY, THE
LAW OF TORTS 5.9A, at 82 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter cited as "F. HARPER"].
For additional discussion of the common law aspects of defamation law, see infra
text accompanying notes 23-78.
6. According to the authors of a classic torts hornbook, "[ilt must be
confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal of the law of defamation which
makes no sense." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as "PROSSER & KEETON"]. Such statement was made with regard to
defamation's common law components, but similar sentiments have been expressed
concerning defamation's constitutional features. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749, 767-74 (1985) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment) (Justice White's criticism of the constitutional rules set forth in the
Court's previous defamation decisions). See also Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad-
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Such renewed interest in pursuing libel and slander 7 claims has
surfaced during a time of development in the law applicable to
employment terminations.' Courts have been called upon to consider,
during the past decade, increasing numbers of tort and breach of
contract suits brought by discharged employees who assert that their
former employers acted wrongfully in terminating their employment. 9
Because employment terminations may arise in circumstances that
create the possibility of harm to the former employees' reputations,
the employment discharge setting has become a fertile source of libel
and slander actions having the appearance of defamation-wrongful
discharge hybrids.' 0 This apparent mixture of defamation litigation
and employment termination litigation is both understandable and
potentially troublesome."

casting and Cable, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2927 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial
of cert.) (former Chief Justice Burger's comments to the same effect).
7. Libel (defamation by means of written word, printed word, or some
physical form), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) and slander (defamation by oral statement), id. are the "twin torts" classified together under the
defamation label. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § Ill, at 771. Although
the legal treatment given the twins is not necessarily identical in every respect, it is
very nearly so. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44.
8. Most notably, in various states there has been a marked erosion of the
traditional rule that the employment of an at-will employee may be terminated for
any reason or no reason. Mallor, Punitive Damagesfor Wrongful Discharge of At
Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 449, 451-52 (1985); Mauk, Wrongful
Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201,
205-06 (1985).
9. For analysis of recent developments in the law pertaining to employment
terminations and discussion of the different tort and contract theories that may be
relied upon by a former employee who wishes to contest the validity of his
termination from employment, see Mallor, supra note 8, at 456-72; Mauk, supra
note 8, at 209-54; Peirce, Mann, & Roberts, Employee Termination At Will: A
Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1, 19-36 (1982). Although references are
made herein to wrongful discharge suits because such claims and defamation suits
sometimes may be based upon the same general set of facts, the specifics of the
law applicable to employment terminations are beyond the scope of this article and
hence will not be dealt with herein.
10. See Middleton, Employers Face Upsurge in Suits Over Defamation, Nat'l
L.J., May 4, 1987, at 1, col. 4; Stricharchuk, Fired Employees Turn the Reason
For Dismissal Into a Legal Weapon, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 33, col. 4. Often,
the discharged employee-plaintiff's defamation claim against the former employer is
joined with one or more claims in which the validity of the employment termination
is questioned. See, e.g., Poison v. Davis, 635 F.Supp. 1130 (D. Kan. 1986); Lewis
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Neighbors v.
Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. App. 1985).
11. Given the natural tendency of plaintiffs' attorneys to plead various
theories of recovery as a means of safeguarding their clients' interests, it is not
surprising that in states in which wrongful discharge claims are recognized, a
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Although most of the recent change in the law of defamation has
been with regard to its constitutional aspects, 12 issues arising in the
employment termination-based defamation 3 suit are more likely to
pertain to defamation's common law elements 14 rather than to its
constitutional features. 5 Providing a reminder that defamation law's
development is not confined to the constitutional realm, 6 certain
recent employment discharge-related defamation cases suggest a significant trend concerning the traditional common law element of
publication.17 Such trend is toward a limited relaxation of the publication rule in certain instances, so as to allow a qualifying plaintiff
to maintain a defamation action against the defendant even though
it was the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, who revealed to a
third party the defendant's allegedly false and defamatory statements
about the plaintiff. 8 The "compelled self-publication" doctrine, as
this relaxation of, or exception to, the traditional publication rule
has come to be known, '" is of potentially broad application in various

defamation claim would be pleaded and pursued in addition to one or more wrongful
discharge causes of action if the facts reasonably appear to warrant doing so. In
states that do not permit tort claims for wrongful discharge, however, the question
becomes whether a defamation suit should be allowed as an effective means of
accomplishing, by way of the back door, much of what the forbidden wrongful
discharge suit would have been designed to achieve. See Blodgett, New Twist to
Defamation Suits, A.B.A.J., May 1, 1987, at 17. For discussion of such question,
see infra text accompanying notes 268-74.
12. See infra notes 24-28. Accordingly, as even a cursory review of the Index
to Legal Periodicals reveals, most of the extensive scholarly commentary on defamation law during approximately the past two decades has focused on constitutional
issues rather than common law issues.
13. When the term defamation is used herein, it is intended as a reference
to libel as well as to slander unless a contrary intent is expressed. Defamation will
be employed in such manner because of the essential identity in legal treatment
given libel and slander. See supra note 7.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 23-78.
15. See Middleton, supra note 10, at 31, col. 1. For discussion of the reason
for the proposition stated in the text, see infra notes 26-28.
16. Defamation, after all, was not thought to have a constitutional side until
less than 25 years ago, when New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
burst upon the scene with its initial formulations of the constitutional supplements
to the common law of defamation. See infra note 25. With the great amount of
attention being given to the constitutional aspects of defamation, one should not
overlook the capacity of the common law of defamation to develop meaningfully
when the need for change arises. See Smolla, supra note 2, at 49.
17. For discussion of the elements of publication, see infra text accompanying
notes 68-78.
18. E.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y., 389 N.W.2d 876, 886-88
(Minn. 1986).
19. Id. at 886-88. Although the sort of issue presented in Lewis had been
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defamation settings, but is of particular significance and utility in
employment discharge-related defamation actions.
This article will focus on the compelled self-publication doctrine
as it applies to defamation suits arising in the employment termination
context. The decisions of courts that have adopted the doctrine will
be discussed and analyzed, as will the decisions of courts that either
expressly or impliedly have rejected it.20 Also explored herein will be
the virtues, infirmities, and implications of the compelled self-publication rule.2 1 The article's conclusion will be two-fold: first, that
on balance, the compelled self-publication doctrine is more sound
than unsound, and hence should be adopted by other courts as they
face the issue; and second, that certain modifications of the common
law of defamation should accompany the doctrine's adoption, so as
to effect a suitable balance between the respective interests of the
discharged employee and the former employer and to ameliorate the
adverse consequences employers could experience as a result of the
22
adoption of the rule.
I.

DEFAMATION'S TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Essential to discussion and analysis of the compelled self publication doctrine is a preliminary examination of a defamation claim's
necessary elements, at least insofar as such elements pertain to the
typical employment discharge-related defamation action. In a traditional defamation action the common law elements 23 of a claim
frequently will not be supplemented to any great extent by defamation
law's constitutional features. The reason is that certain special proof

dealt with by other courts in earlier decisions, see infra text accompanying notes
136-70, the Supreme Court of Minnesota appears to have coined the "compelled
self-publication" term in the Lewis decision.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 79-244.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 245-90.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 291-352. The common law modifications to be suggested are offered on the assumption that the unclear reach of the

Supreme Court's defamation decisions has not already extended so far as to effect
such safeguards as a matter of federal constitutional law. For discussion of the
uncertainty inherent in the application of defamation law's constitutional components
and the strong prospect that such constitutional elements often may be regarded as
inapplicable to a discharged employee's defamation suit, see infra notes 26-29.
23. When references are made herein to defamation's "common law elements" or to the "common law of defamation," such references are intended to
apply not only to true common law but also to state statutory provisions that

essentially are codifications of common law defamation principles. See, e.g., CAL.
CIVIL CODE

§§ 44-47 (West 1987).
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requirements mandated by the first amendment 24 tend to be triggered
by factors (public official 5 or public figure plaintiff; 26 statement of

24. The portions of the first amendment that are pertinent to defamation are
those prohibiting the government from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
325, 339 (1974) (indicating that in a defamation action, consideration must be given
not only to the first amendment's guarantee of a free press, but also to its promise
of freedom of speech); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 264,
268 (1964) (to the same effect). Although the literal language of the first amendment
applies only to actions taken by the federal government, long-standing interpretations
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause have established that the clause
incorporates the first amendment guarantees, so as to protect persons from infringements of their first amendment rights at the hands of the states. E.g., Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
25. If the plaintiff in a defamation action is a public official, he or she must
prove "actual malice" in order to prevail. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279 (1964). Actual malice exists when the defendant made the false and
defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
for its truth or falsity. Id. at 279-80. Whenever actual malice must be proved, the
applicable standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, rather than a mere
preponderance of the evidence. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974). Cf. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86 (stating that actual malice must
be proved with "convincing clarity"). For discussion of other situations in which
proof of actual malice is required, see infra notes 26-27.
26. Defamation plaintiffs who are public figures also must prove actual
malice in order to prevail. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). There are two ways one may become a
public figure for purposes of the rule requiring proof of actual malice. The first is
to become a general purpose public figure, in the sense of having achieved "such
pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in
all contexts." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). The second
is to become a limited purpose public figure by "voluntarily injecting himself or
being drawn into a particular public controversy." Id.
The typical plaintiff in the employment discharge-related defamation case will
not be considered a public official for obvious reasons, and will lack the "pervasive
fame or notoriety" necessary to make him or her a general purpose public figure.
Neither is it very likely that he or she would be considered a limited purpose public
figure, given the Supreme Court's restrictive view of what is a "public controversy"
and what constitutes "voluntarily injecting" oneself into such a controversy. See
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454, 457 (1976). See also Smolla, supra note
2, at 56-59 (criticizing the Court's narrow application of the limited public figure
concept). Although in Gertz the Court appeared to allow for the possibility of
becoming a limited purpose public figure involuntarily, by being "drawn into" a
public controversy, 418 U.S. at 351, the approach taken in subsequent decisions
seems to indicate that one cannot become a public figure that way after all. See
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979); Firestone, 424 U.S. at
454, 457.
Because the discharged employee-plaintiff is unlikely to be considered a public
official or either sort of public figure, he or she will fall into the private figure
category most of the time. In Gertz, the Court held that a private figure plaintiff
need not prove actual malice in order to prevail, but must prove some degree of
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public concern; 27 and, perhaps, media defendant 28 ) that often are not

present in a discharged employee's defamation

Suit.29

fault as defined by the individual states. 418 U.S. at 346-47. The Court's holding
in such regard has been interpreted as requiring the private figure plaintiff to prove
at least negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to ascertain the truth. See
id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (reading the majority opinion in such manner).
It also was established in Gertz that if the private figure plaintiff does prove actual
malice, such plaintiff becomes entitled to recover presumed and/or punitive damages,
id. at 349-50, but if such plaintiff proves merely the lesser degree of fault necessary
to enable him or her to prevail in the suit, only damages for actual injury are to
be awarded. Id. at 349, 350. Even though discharged employees ordinarily would
be private figures, it still is uncertain whether the above-noted Gertz rules would
apply to them. For discussion of the reasons for such uncertainty, see infra notes
27-28.
27. Although New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974) constructed a set of constitutional proof requirements that appeared
to be triggered solely by the status of the plaintiff, see supra notes 25-26, the Court
has indicated recently that consideration of the element of public concern must play
at least some role in the analysis. In the context of a private figure plaintiff case,
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), five
Justices agreed that Gertz, or at least the Gertz rule concerning what must be proved
before presumed and punitive damages can be awarded, see supra note 26, does not
apply where the defendant's statement did not deal with a matter of public concern.
Id. at 751, 761, 763 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor,
JJ.); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 774 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment). The only issue actually presented by the Dun &
Bradstreet facts pertained to whether the case was governed by Gertz's requirement
that presumed and punitive damages not be awarded absent proof of actual malice.
Id. at 751, 752; id. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the parties were
not questioning the Gertz requirement that the plaintiff prove some fault in order
to be able to prevail).
After Dun & Bradstreet, it is unclear whether the Court, with regard to cases
involving private figure plaintiffs and statements of only private concern: (1.) has
removed all fault requirements; or (2.) instead, has left intact the Gertz requirement
of proving some fault in order for the plaintiff to prevail, see supra note 26, and
has removed only the need for proof of actual malice as a prerequisite to recovery
of presumed and punitive damages in such a case. For additional discussion of Dun
& Bradstreet and the effect of its public concern requirement on future private
figure plaintiff cases, see Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role for an
Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. REv. 241
(1987). See also Gertz, Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. Invites
Controversy, 19 J. MAR. L. REv. 929 (1986) (analysis of Dun & Bradstreet by
attorney Elmer Gertz, the plaintiff in the landmark Gertz decision referred to above).
With regard to employment discharge-related defamation actions, the significance of Dun & Bradstreet lies in its creation of the strong prospect that courts
inclined toward a broad reading of the decision's effect may regard the constitutional
fault requirements as completely inapplicable to the typical defamation action
brought by a discharged employee. The reason for such conclusion would be that
in the usual defamation case arising in the employment termination setting, the
defendant's statements would not have dealt with a matter of public concern. It
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At common law, defamation consists of the unprivileged publication of a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff.3 0 A

must be remembered, however, that what constitutes a matter of public concern is
unclear after Dun & Bradstreet, which contains minimal guidance regarding the
making of public concern-private concern determinations and appears to encourage
ad hoc resolutions of the issue. Langvardt, supra at 258-60.
28. Employment discharge-related libel suits generally will involve nonmedia
defendants. Such fact may be pertinent to a determination of whether the constitutional elements of defamation law, see supra notes 24-27, are triggered. A question
that has persisted despite the Supreme Court's various defamation decisions of the
past twenty-three years is whether such constitutional elements apply only when the
defendant is a member of the media or, instead, without regard for the defendant's
media or nonmedia status. The Court has given conflicting signals concerning whether
there is or should be any media-nonmedia distinction in the constitutional law of
defamation. For example, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985), the plurality expressly avoided deciding the media-nonmedia
issue, id. at 753, choosing instead to resolve the case on the basis of a public
concern-private concern distinction. See supra note 27. Nevertheless, the various
opinions in the case revealed that at least five of the concurring and dissenting
justices were inclined to reject any media-nonmedia distinction. 472 U.S. at 773
(White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 781-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
Less than a year after Dun & Bradstreet was decided, however, the Court
handed down its decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct.
1558 (1986). The majority opinion's various statements of the issues and the holding
expressly were restricted to cases involving media defendants, id. at 1559, 1562,
1563, 1564, but the Court noted that it was refraining from deciding the question
whether the same holding would apply in a case involving a nonmedia defendant.
Id. at 1565 n.4. Adding to the uncertainty, Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who
joined the Court's opinion in Hepps and thereby created a five-justice majority,
also joined in a separate concurrence in which they asserted that there should be
no media-nonmedia distinction. Id. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by
Blackmun, J.). The present significance (or insignificance, as the case may be) of
the defendant's media or nonmedia status, therefore, remains unclear. For additional
analysis of the media-nonmedia issue and expression of the view that no such
distinction should exist in the constitutional law of defamation, see Langvardt,
Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order
From Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PrrT. L. REv. 91, 114-23 (1987).
29. Nevertheless, constitutional issues lurk beneath the surface of even the
typical employment termination-related defamation claim, because of ongoing uncertainty concerning when the first amendment requirements are triggered. See supra
notes 27-28. Even if the constitutional aspects of defamation law ordinarily are
inapplicable to the discharged employee's suit, it may be that at least for a compelled
self-publication suit, the common law of defamation should be modified to contain
requirements not unlike certain ones of the constitutional features. See infra text
accompanying notes 291-327, 339-52.
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 558. With the exception of the requirement
that the defendant's statement be about the plaintiff (the "of and concerning"
requirement, see id. §§ 558, 564 comment g), the other essential elements referred
to in the sentence of text to which this note is appended will be elaborated upon
elsewhere in the text and accompanying notes. See infra text accompanying notes
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statement is considered defamatory "if it tends to so harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." 3 ' Regardless of the defamatory nature of a statement, no
liability can be imposed on the speaker unless the offending statement
was false.3 2 The common law approach has been to allow a presumption of falsity that arises upon proof of publication33 of a

31, 78. The "of and concerning" requirement, which tends to arise in situations
involving statements that did not mention the plaintiff by name or referred to a
group of which the plaintiff was a member, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 564
comments a, b, 564A, will not be discussed further herein because such requirement
generally does not present a significant issue in the employment termination based
defamation suit. In a case stemming from such a context, it ordinarily is quite clear
that the defendant's statements were about the plaintiff.
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 559.
32. Id. § 581A. In view of the definition of the term defamatory, see supra
text accompanying note 31, even certain true statements may be defamatory because
of their tendency to lower, in the eyes of others, the standing of the person who is
the subject of the statements. Therefore, distinctions must be made between true
defamatory statements, which cannot subject the defendant to defamation liability,
and false defamatory statements, which may subject the defendant to such liability.
Although the "truth is a defense" platitude is so familiar that no citation therefore
is needed, it should be noted that such statement would be more accurate if it were
rephrased in a manner similar to the following: "If the defendant's statement about
the plaintiff was true, the plaintiff cannot prevail in a defamation action brought
against such defendant on the basis of such statement." See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 581A comment d. Such suggested rephrasing is to be preferred because in
many defamation cases, the plaintiff is required to prove the falsity of the offending
statement, rather than requiring the defendant to prove its truth. See infra note 36.
Regardless of how the burdens of proof and persuasion are allocated on the
questions of truth and falsity, the maker of a defamatory, but true, statement is
protected from defamation liability even if the statement was made out of ill will
or with the intent of harming the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 581A
comment a. Some states have statutory or constitutional provisions indicating that
the truth of a statement does not insulate the maker thereof from liability for
defamation if the statement was not made for proper purposes and motives. See,
e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-840 (Reissue 1985). Such provisions probably are invalid,
however, given the Supreme Court's strong indications that the first amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press insulate the maker of a
true statement from liability in a defamation action. See Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1564, 1565 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 341 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
Although the maker of a true statement cannot be held liable therefor in a defamation
action, the same result would not necessarily be obtained if the true statement were
part of a factual setting that fit within the framework of a public disclosure of
private facts claim. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 652D. No attempt is made
herein to deal with the applicability of such invasion of privacy claims to the
employment termination setting.
33. The element of publication will be discussed in infra text accompanying
notes 68-78.
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defamatory statement about the plaintiff, with the defendant being
34
allowed to escape liability by proving the truth of his statement.

Since the Supreme Court's recognition of the first amendment aspects
of defamation law,35 the common law presumption of falsity has
been eradicated from certain sorts of defamation cases, in favor of
a rule requiring the plaintiff to carry the burdens of proof and
persuasion on the falsity question.3 6 However, such presumption of
falsity still may apply in the usual employment discharge related
defamation case because of the probable status of the plaintiff and
37
the nature of the speech likely to be involved.
Another common law presumption of which plaintiffs have received
the benefit is the presumption of damages in a libel suit, once
publication of the offending statement has been proved.38 In a slander
suit, however, damages generally are not presumed at common law
and special damages, in the form of pecuniary loss, must be proved
in order to make the slanderous statement actionable, unless the

34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 581A comment b; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 6, § 116, at 839.
35. See supra notes 25-28.
36. Plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures must prove the falsity
of the offending statement, in addition to proving the defendant's knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176
(1979). Private figure plaintiffs must also prove the statement's falsity, at least in
cases involving a media defendant and a statement of public concern. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1559 (1986). The effect of a rule
requiring the plaintiff to prove falsity is that the defendant may escape liability even
if his statement was false but was not demonstrably false. Id. at 1563-64. Nevertheless, such a rule is preferable, from a first amendment standpoint, over a rule
that would create the prospect of a defendant being held liable for a true statement
whose truth he could not demonstrate. Id. at 1564.
37. The proof of falsity requirement imposed on public official and public
figure plaintiffs, see supra note 36, would not apply to the ordinary plaintiff in a
defamation suit stemming from the employment termination setting, because such
plaintiff is likely to be considered a private figure. Assuming that the usual
employment discharge-based defamation suit is unlikely to involve statements pertaining to matters of public concern, see supra note 27, such an action would not
come within the language of the proof of falsity holding in Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1559 (1986). See supra note 36. In addition, the
probable lack of a media defendant in such a suit may also mean that the plaintiff
would not be expected to prove falsity. See Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565 n.4. It would
be a sound notion, from either a constitutional or a common law perspective, to
require all plaintiffs in all defamation cases to prove falsity. See Langvardt, supra
note 28 at 110-14. If for no reason other than achieving consistency in the law of
defamation, there is merit in such an across the-board rule, which will be proposed
later herein. See infra text accompanying notes 302-14.
38. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 569; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
6, § 112, at 795-96; 2 F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 5.9A, at 82.
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defendant's statement constituted slander per se.3 9 A case involving
slander per se40 is treated as a libel case for the purpose of the
common law rule concerning presumed damages. 41 Such libel-slander
distinction with regard to the availability of presumed damages
ordinarily will not be significant in the employment terminationrelated defamation suit. Even if the defendant employer's statement
amounted to slander rather than libel, the context in which the
statement was made dictates that the statement probably will be
viewed as tending to harm the plaintiff in his trade, occupation, or
profession, 42 and hence will be considered slander per se. 43 Therefore,

39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 570, 575; 2 F. HARPER, supra note 5,
§ 5.9A, at 82. Special damages would include, for instance, the loss of prospective
employment, customers, or opportunities having some economic value. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 575 comment b, illustrations 1-3, 5. Proof that the plaintiff
experienced emotional distress as a result of the defendant's statement does not
constitute proof of special damages, although such emotional distress may be taken
into account as an element of damages in a slander case, if the requisite special
damages also are proved. Id. comment c.
40. A statement constitutes slander per se if it is false and does one or more
of the following: imputes to the plaintiff the commission of certain sorts of crimes;
alleges that the plaintiff has a loathsome disease; tends to harm the plaintiff in his
or her trade, business, or profession; or portrays the plaintiff as having engaged in
serious sexual misconduct. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 570-574. See 2 F.
HARPER, supra note 5, § 5.9, at 79 (to same general effect).
41. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 570; 2 F. HARPER, supra note 5, §
5.9A, at 82. The common law's allowance of presumed damages is premised on the
notion that false and defamatory statements cause harm to reputation that safely
may be assumed to have occurred but may be difficult to prove. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, § 621 comment a. Cases of libel have been singled out for application
of the presumed damages rule because of the relative permanence of the form libel
may take and the accompanying likelihood of ongoing damages. See id. § 568
comment d, 568A comment a. Cases of slander per se are treated the same way
because statements falling within the slander per se categories seem especially likely
to cause injury to reputation. See id. §§ 571 comment f, 572 comment c, 573
comment c. If presumed damages properly are allowable in a defamation action,
the plaintiff need not prove any special damages in the form of pecuniary loss and
need not prove any emotional distress stemming from the defendant's statement,
but the plaintiff may present such proof if he so chooses in an effort to augment
his claim. See id. §§ 622 comment a, 623 comment a. It must be remembered,
however, that the common law's presumed damages rules may be subject, in some
cases, to certain constitutional limitations. See supra note 26 and infra note 343.
42. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 573 comments b, c. If, however, the
defendant employer's statement concerning the plaintiff employee imputes only a
single mistake or single improper act on the part of the plaintiff in connection with
his employment, the statement is not considered actionable without proof of special
damages unless it fairly implies habitual action of such nature or the lack of qualities
to be expected of one engaged in such employment. Id. comment d.
43. For a listing of the sorts of statements that may constitute slander per
se, see supra note 40.
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as the law presently stands, the usual employment discharge-based
defamation suit is likely to feature the prospect of presumed damages,
unless the court hearing the suit regards as applicable certain presumed damage prohibitions that are part of the constitutional law
of defamation."4
Although the common law approach to defamation has involved
the imposition of liability without fault 45 upon defendants, the common law traditionally has allowed the defense of privilege, which
may insulate from liability the publishers of certain false and defam48
47
atory statements. 6 Such privilege is either absolute or conditional.
The applicability of the absolute privilege is confined to narrow
situations 49 that generally are not part of an employment terminationbased defamation suit. Instead, it is the conditional privilege that

44. The treatment the constitutional law of defamation gives to presumed
damages is discussed supra note 26. To be proposed later herein is an elimination
of the common law's allowance of presumed damages, at least with regard to cases
based upon compelled self-publication. See infra text accompanying notes 338, 34252.
45. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 113, at 804. Such strict liability
approach stands in marked contrast to the first amendment-based approach of
requiring not only that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement but
also that the defendant displayed the requisite degree of fault (actual malice or
negligence) in connection with the making of such statement. See supra notes 2526.
46. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 585 introductory note (preceding such
section). See also id. § 558 (liability for defamation depends in part upon there
having been an "unprivileged publication"). The rationale for allowing the defense
of privilege is that in certain situations, the interests to be served thereby tend to
outweigh the injury done to the plaintiff. Id. § 585 introductory note. For discussion
of situations in which the defense of privilege is applicable, see infra note 49 and
infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
47. When an absolute privilege applies, the protection from defamation
liability afforded the holder of the privilege is complete, even if such person had
improper motives in making the false and defamatory statement or knew of the
statement's falsity at the time of making it. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6,
§ 114, at 816; RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 585 introductory note.
48. The term "qualified privilege" often is used synonymously with the term
"conditional privilege." See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at
825. A conditional privilege differs from an absolute privilege in that unlike the
protection afforded by an absolute privilege, see supra note 47, the shield of a
conditional privilege may be lost if the party who otherwise would be entitled to
such a privilege has acted improperly. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 593, 599. For
discussion of when a conditional privilege arises and what may cause such a privilege
to be forfeited, see infra text accompanying notes 51-67.
49. E.g., statements by judges, attorneys, litigants, and testifying witnesses
in connection with judicial proceedings, RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 585-88,
certain statements by legislators and other government officials, see id. §§ 590, 591,
and statements communicated by one spouse to the other spouse. Id. § 592.

1987]

DEFAMATION IN EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGE

239

often is pertinent in a defamation suit arising out of such a setting.50
A conditional privilege may exist in the following situations: (1.)
when the statement about the plaintiff was necessary to advance the
legitimate interest of the speaker; 5' (2.) when the statement about the
plaintiff was necessary to further or protect the legitimate interest of
a person other than the speaker; 52 and, (3.) when the statement about
the plaintiff was made to further a common interest shared by the
speaker and the party to whom the statement was made.5 3 When
former employers make statements concerning discharged employees
to prospective employers, the former employers generally are considered entitled to the benefit of a conditional privilege, on the theory
that they are making such statements to further the interests of the
prospective employers . 4 Similarly, when an employer makes statements to continuing employees concerning the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment, such statements ordinarily are
also regarded as subject to a conditional privilege, because of the

50. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at 827. See also Eaton,
The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond:
An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1361 (1975) (noting that the conditional
privilege protects one who is responding to a prospective employer's inquiry about
an applicant's fitness for employment).
51. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at 825; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 594; Smolla, supra note 2, at 65. For example, a conditional privilege
may attach to statements made by a person in connection with defending his physical
person or reputation, or in connection with defending or recovering his property.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 594 comments f, h, j, k.
52. 2 F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 5.26, at 219; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 6, § 115, at 826; RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 595; Smolla, supra note
2, at 66. Interests that may trigger the privilege include a variety of business,
professional, property, and domestic interests. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 595
comment d.
53. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at 828; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 596. For instance, appropriate common interests may arise by virtue of
such facts as the speaker's and listener's shared ownership of property, membership
in the same association, or employment by the same business entity. Id. comments
c, d, e.
The text's discussion of circumstances in which a conditional privilege may
arise, see supra text accompanying notes 50-55, is not intended as a complete listing
of the circumstances in which a conditional privilege may arise. For additional
discussion of such circumstances, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 597-598A.
54. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at 827; Eaton,
supra note 50, at 1361. For discussion of the applicability of the conditional privilege
to the employment reference context, see Duffy, Defamation and Employer Privilege,
9 EMPL. REL. L.J. 444, 446-50 (1983); Castagnera Cain, Defamation, Invasion of
Privacy, and Use of Lie Detectors in Employee Relations-An Overview, 4 GLENDALE
L. REv. 189, 196-99 (1982); Stevens, The Letter of Recommendation as a Privileged
Communication, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 3-8 (1978).
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employer's and the employees' common interest in the free exchange
of information necessary to the operation of the business."
If the defendant's defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff
was made in a situation to which the conditional privilege applied,
the defendant is shielded from liability even if the statement was
false, unless the defendant abused such privilege.5 6 The protection
from liability afforded by the conditional privilege is lost if abuse
has taken place. 7 Abuse of the privilege has occurred if the speaker
exceeded the privilege's scope by stating more than reasonably was
necessary to further the interest at stake5 8 or by communicating the
false and defamatory statement to someone whose receipt of the

information was not reasonably necessary to furtherance of such
interest.5 9 In addition, the conditional privilege has been abused, and
hence its protections are lost, if the speaker made the false and
defamatory statement with malice. 6° In recent years, courts have
taken differing views concerning whether the malice necessary for
forfeiture of the conditional privilege is what may be referred to as
common law malice 61 (making the statement out of ill will, spite
63
62
motives, improper purposes, and the like) or, instead, actual malice

55. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 596 comment c. See also 2 F.
HARPER, supra note 5, § 5.26, at 221 (privilege generally attaches to communications among corporate agents regarding supposed misconduct of corporate employees).
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 593.
57. Id. § 599; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at 825, 832-35.
58. Smolla, supra note 2, at 65. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 605,
605A.
59. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at 832, 833; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, §§ 604, 605; Smolla, supra note 2, at 65.
60. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 115, at 833.
61. See, e.g., Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98, 103-04
(Iowa 1985); Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1, 722 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Kan.
1986); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980).
62. Smolla, supra note 2, at 65, 79; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6,
115, at 834.The common law concept of malice is broad enough to cover a statement
made by the defendant solely as a result of bad feelings toward the plaintiff, as
well as a statement made by the defendant for a purpose other than furtherance of
the interest giving rise to the conditional privilege. See id. See also Smolla, supra
note 2, at 65 n.308 (noting that such concept of malice is "somewhat confused and
imprecise"). However, if the defendant made the statement for the purpose of
furthering the interest triggering the condititional privilege, the additional fact that
the defendant possessed ill will toward the plaintiff generally will not result in a
forfeiture of the protection afforded by the privilege. PROSSER & KEETON, supra

note 6, § 115, at 834;

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 7, § 603 comment a.

63. See, e.g., Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 1986); Saunders
v. Van Pelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Me. 1985); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
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(making the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth). 64 Complicating matters further, some jurisdictions allow the defendant's conditional privilege to be overcome
by a showing that the defendant was negligent in failing to ascertain
the truth before making the offending statement. 61 In view of the
important role the conditional privilege plays in the usual employment
discharge-related defamation suit, 66 clarification and consistency are
needed concerning the sort of malice necessary to effect a loss of
the privilege and concerning the role a showing of the defendant's
67
negligence should play in such an action.
Publication is the remaining common law defamation element that
has become increasingly significant in employment termination-based
defamation cases. 68 Because the essence of a defamation claim is
580, 599, 350 A.2d 688, 699 (Md. 1976); Carter v. Willert Home Prod., Inc., 714
S.W.2d 506, 512 (Mo. 1986). Other courts appear to have taken the position that
proof of either actual malice or common law malice would be sufficient to defeat
the privilege. See, e.g., Smith v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 614 F. Supp. 558, 562
(W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1986); Bolling v. Baker, 671 S.W.2d
559, 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 79 (1985).
64. What is contemplated by the text's reference to actual malice and the
text's accompanying definition therefore is the same concept that is part of the
constitutional law of defamation. See supra notes 25-26. Semantic confusion is a
likely consequence of the Supreme Court's decision to employ the term actual malice
and then ascribe to it a definition (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth) that has little or nothing to do with the meaning ordinarily carried by
the word "malice." See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, in order to minimize the likelihood of such confusion,
clarification must be given concerning how certain terms will be employed herein.
The term common law malice will be used to signify malice in its usual sense of ill
will, spite motives, improper purposes, and the like. Whenever a reference to
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth is intended, the term actual
malice will be employed.
65. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 600 comments a, b. Such a rule is
troublesome in the context of cases to which the constitutional aspects of defamation
law apply, because in such cases, a showing of at least negligence (depending upon
the status of the plaintiff) must be made out in order for the plaintiff to prove a
prima facie case. See supra note 26. The defense of privilege becomes meaningless
in such cases if negligence proved by the plaintiff as part of his case in chief is
considered enough to cause forfeiture of the privilege. See Smolla, supra note 2, at
66 n.309. As will be stated and discussed later herein, proof of the defendant's
negligence should not be sufficient to effect a loss of the protection afforded by a
conditional privilege, regardless of whether the case is one governed solely by the
common law or by the common law as supplemented by first amendment requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 328-29.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
67. Such subjects will be discussed later herein. See infra text accompanying
notes 328-35.
68. It is the compelled self-publication variant that has caused new attention
to be focused on the traditional, generally noncontroversial publication requirement.
See Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17.
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harm to reputation, 69 whether actual or presumed, 70 defamation law
contains a requirement that the false and defamatory statement must
72
have been published 7' to at least one person other than the plaintiff.
Such publication requirement thus is premised on the common-sense
notion that harm to the plaintiff's reputation could not have occurred
if it was only the plaintiff who heard, read, or saw what the defendant
communicated about the plaintiff. 73 The effect of the publication
requirement, as it ordinarily has been viewed, is to allow the defendant freedom to say virtually anything he wishes to say about the
plaintiff and be free from defamation liability regardless of the
statement's falsity, if he communicates the statement only to the
plaintiff. 74 If the defendant did not make the communication of the
statement to a third party, and it instead was the plaintiff who
informed the third party of what the defendant said about the
plaintiff, the publication requirement generally is not regarded as
75
having been met.

69. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 111, at 771.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
71. The word published is used herein to mean "communicated," whether
by a media speaker or a nonmedia speaker. The words publish, publisher, and
publication are used in the same sense.
72. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 577; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
6, § 113, at 798. Therefore, the communication constituting publication need not
be widespread. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 577 comment b. The publication
requirement is met if the false and defamatory statement was communicated to the
third party either intentionally or negligently. Id. comment k. In order for the
offending statement to be actionable, the third party need not have believed the
statement, but "must [have] understood in a defamatory sense." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 6, § 111, at 780.
73. 2 F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 5.15, at 119-20; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 577 comment b.
74. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 113, at 797-98; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, § 577 comments b, m.
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 577 comment m; 2 F. HARPER, supra
note 5, § 5.15, at 122. "[Oirdinarily if the plaintiff himself showed the [defamatory
material] to a third person or read it to such person, he has himself to thank for
the publication" and is not allowed to recover as against the maker of the defamatory
statement. Id. Such general rule applies, with some exceptions, "even though it was
to be expected that [the plaintiff himself] might publish it." PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 6, § 113, at 802 (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). The exceptions
to such rule depend upon there having been a virtual necessity for the plaintiff to
disclose to a third party the false and defamatory statement made about him, as
well as a reasonable basis for the defendant to have been aware of such necessity.
See id. For instance, if the defendant, knowing that the plaintiff is blind, sends the
plaintiff a letter containing false and defamatory statements about the plaintiff,
publication occurs when the plaintiff has another person read the letter to him.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 577 comment m, illustration 10. The compelled self-
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Except for skirmishes over such technical niceties, such as whether
communications between or among employees of the same business
entity constitute publication, 76 the publication element, until rather
recently, has tended to generate few significant issues in defamation
litigation. 77 The advent of the compelled self-publication doctrine, to
be discussed and analyzed in the remaining sections of this article,
promises to remove the publication element from defamation law's
back burner of issues and place it in a position of prominence, at
least for purposes of defamation suits having their origin in the
78
employment discharge context.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPELLED SELF-

PUBLICATION DOCTRINE
Exploration of the implications of the compelled self- publication
doctrine must be preceded by discussion of the employment termination-related defamation cases in which the doctrine has been an
issue. Courts in eight states have adopted the compelled self-publication rule, or something similar thereto, in connection with defamation suits arising from the employment discharge or a comparable

publication doctrine, as it has developed in the employment discharge context,
likewise depends upon the necessity of the plaintiff's disclosure, along with the
defendant's reasonable awareness of the likelihood of such necessary disclosure. See
infra text accompanying notes 102-08.
76. Although courts have taken differing views concerning whether there is
publication in such situations, PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 113, at 798,
799, the better (and majority) view appears to be that such communications do
constitute publication. Id.; 2 F. HARPER, supra note 5, § 5.15, at 124 n.21. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 577 comments h, i. Some communications among
corporate employees may be conditionally privileged, see supra text accompanying
notes 51-55, but the attachment of a privilege to a communication does not mean
there was no publication. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 113, at 799
(observing that some courts tend to "confuse the question of publication with that
of privilege"). For a survey of cases dealing with the question whether there is
publication in connection with communications between employees of the same
business entity, see Note, Libel and Slander-IntracorporateCommunications as
Publication to Third Persons-Luttrellv. United Telephone System, 33 U. KAN. L.
REv. 759 (1985).
77. The relative straightforwardness of the publication requirement, as compared to other aspects of defamation law, see supra notes 25-28 and supra text
accompanying notes 30 67, seems the likely reason for such state of affairs.
78. Of course, the compelled self-publication issue will not arise in all
employment discharge-related defamation suits, because it is to be expected that in
many of such cases, the defendant will have communicated the false and defamatory
statements directly to the third party.
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setting. 79 Courts, in a similar number of jurisdictions, either expressly
or impliedly have rejected the rule.80 Most of the decisions, however,
have been by intermediate state appeals courts rather than the states'
highest courts.8 A notable exception is Lewis v. Equitable LifeAssurance Soc'y.,82 decided in 1986 by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. The Lewis decision's embracing of the compelled selfpublication doctrine 83 constituted the first time a state's highest court
expressly had adopted it in an employment discharge-based defamation suit.8 4 Lewis therefore seems destined to play an influential
85
role when other courts must decide whether to recognize the doctrine

79. The eight are: California (McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.
App. 3d 787, 798, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94-95 (1980)); Georgia (Colonial Stores, Inc.
v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 840, 38 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1946)); Kansas (Polson v.
Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130, 1147 (D. Kan. 1986)); Michigan (Grist v. Upjohn Co.,
16 Mich. App. 452, 485, 168 N.W.2d 389, 406 (1969)); Minnesota (Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y., 389 N.W.2d 876, 886-88 (Minn. 1986)); Missouri (Herberholt
v. dePaul Community Health Center, 625 S.W.2d 617, 624-25 (Mo. 1981)) and
(Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822, 824-25
(Mo. App. 1985)); Ohio (Bretz v. Mayer, 1 Ohio Misc. 59, 65, 203 N.E.2d 665,
669-70 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1963); and Texas (Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696
S.W.2d 439, 445-46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985)) and (First State Bank v. Ake, 606
S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).
A ninth state, Iowa, apparently would recognize the compelled self-publication
doctrine in the employment discharge-based defamation action. The Supreme Court
of Iowa adopted the doctrine in Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734, 737-38 (Iowa
1982), a slander of title action that was not connected with an employment setting.
In doing so, that court noted with approval certain employment termination related
cases cited earlier in this note. Id. at 737-38.
80. For discussion of cases of such nature, see infra text accompanying notes
239-44.
81. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 79 and cases cited infra notes 239,
240, 243. Some of these decisions have been by federal district courts rather than
by intermediate state appeals courts.
82. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
83. Id. at 886-88.
84. In addition to the Lewis decision's express approval of the doctrine, the
highest courts of two other states, Iowa and Missouri, impliedly have given approval
to the use of the compelled self-publication rule in defamation suits stemming from
the employment termination setting. See Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734, 737-38
(Iowa 1982); Herberholt v. dePaul Community Health Center, 625 S.W.2d 617, 62425 (Mo. 1981). For additional discussion of Belcher, see supra note 79 and infra
text accompanying notes 181-89. Further discussion of Herberholt appears in infra
text accompanying notes 207-15.
85. Ironically, the future effect of Lewis may be greater outside Minnesota
than within the state, because of a recently enacted Minnesota statute that will
restrict discharged employees' ability to rely on the compelled self-publication
doctrine as part of the basis of defamation suits against former employers. See infra
text accompanying notes 119-35. Nevertheless, the Lewis rationale still should be
persuasive to courts in other states.
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or adhere to the traditional approach to situations in which it is the
plaintiff who communicated the defendant's statements to third parties. 6 Hence, special consideration of the decision is in order.
A.

Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y.

In Lewis, the plaintiffs were former employees who claimed that
Equitable had discharged them in violation of supposed employment
contracts and had defamed them in the process.17 The factual setting
from which the defamation claim arose began when Equitable sent
the plaintiffs to another city on company business. Before they left
on the trip, the plaintiffs, who had not previously traveled in connection with their employment, were given only minimal information
concerning Equitable's policy on travel expenses. 8 They were given
certain advances for travel expenses and were told to keep receipts
for expenses incurred. When they returned, the plaintiffs learned of
89
the need to submit expense reports, which they then prepared.
The plaintiffs complied with requests that they change certain
portions of their expense reports because they had been given incorrect completion instructions by the company. Later, however, when
Equitable requested that the plaintiffs again revise their expense
reports so that such reports would reflect lower expenses, 9° they
refused to do so believing the original expense amounts reported had
been incurred honestly and reasonably and in accordance with instructions given them before their departure on the trip. 91 Although
Equitable apparently recognized that the expenses had been incurred.
honestly and that the plaintiffs had not been given adequate instructions concerning expenses before they were sent on the trip, 92 Equitable terminated the plaintiffs' employment for the stated reason of

86. For discussion of such traditional approach, see supra text accompanying
notes 74-75.
87. 389 N.W.2d at 880. The plaintiffs claimed that employment contracts
existed on the basis of certain provisions in an employee handbook. Id. The court
affirmed the jury's award of compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiffs on
the breach of contract and defamation claims. Id. Further discussion herein of the
Lewis decision will be confined to the defamation aspect of the case.
88. Id. at 880-81.
89. Id. at 881.
90. Id. Equitable apparently sought to recoup part of what had been advanced
to the plaintiffs for travel expenses. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 881-82. Equitable also admitted that the plaintiffs' job performance
had been at least satisfactory and, in some instances, commendable. Id. at 882.
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"gross insubordination" when they declined to alter their expense
reports any further. 9
Publication in its usual sense 94 seemed conspicuously absent from
the Lewis facts, because Equitable informed only the plaintiffs that
the reason for their discharge was gross insubordination. Equitable
made no such statement to prospective employers of the plaintiffs
or to any other third parties. 95 It was the plaintiffs themselves who,
in response to interview questions by prospective employers concerning an explanation for their terminations, informed the prospective
employers that they had been discharged for the stated reason of
gross insubordination. 96 After they disclosed the reason given by
Equitable for their discharges from employment, the plaintiffs experienced difficulty in obtaining new employment. 97
In instructing the jury concerning the plaintiffs' defamation claims
against Equitable, the trial court gave an instruction that allowed the
use of the compelled self-publication approach to the publication
requirement. 98 The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, awarding
each of them $75,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in
punitive damages on their defamation claims. 99 The jury's verdict
and the trial court's accompanying judgment were affirmed by the

93. Id. at 881.
94. Thit is referring to the ordinary situation in which the defendant himself,
as the maker of the false and defamatory statement, communicated it directly to a
third party. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
95. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 882, 886. Equitable's policy concerning releasing
information about a former employee was to give prospective employers only the
dates of such person's employment and such person's last job title, unless the former
employee had given written authorization for the release of additional information.
Id. at 882. From the court's statement of the facts, it is safe to conclude that
Equitable adhered to such policy with regard to the plaintiffs. See id.
96. Id. at 882, 886. When they sought new employment, the plaintiffs
generally disclosed, presumably on application forms, that their previous employment
had been terminated. During interviews conducted by prospective employers, the
plaintiffs then would be asked to explain the terminations. Besides responding to
such questions by telling the prospective employers Equitable's stated reason for
discharging them, the plaintiffs attempted to explain the circumstances surrounding
the terminations. Id. at 882.
97. Id.
98. This is revealed in the opinion of the court of appeals. See 361 N.W.2d
875, 880 (Minn. App. 1985).
99. Although the supreme court's opinion refers to the jury's verdicts for
the plaintiffs on their defamation claims, 389 N.W.2d at 880, 891, the opinion
makes no mention of the amounts of damages awarded. The figures stated in the
text are set forth in the opinion of the court of appeals. 361 N.W.2d at 879.
Separate amounts were awarded to the plaintiffs in connection with their successful
breach of contract claims. Id.
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Court of Appeals of Minnesota. I°° The supreme court upheld the
awards of compensatory damages but struck down the awards of
punitive damages.10'
The compelled self-publication issue, of course, was critical to
resolution of the plaintiffs' defamation claims. 02 Noting that some
courts had recognized an exception to the general rule that there is
no valid defamation claim if the plaintiff communicated the defendant's statement to a third party, 013 the court concluded that certain
cases' °4 justified allowing the plaintiff to pursue a defamation claim
against the defendant if two conditions were met: (1.) the plaintiff
"was in some way compelled" to communicate the defendant's false
and defamatory statement to a third person; and (2.) it was "foreseeable to the defendant that the [plaintiff] would be so compelled."' 15 The court found especially compelling the notion that in
situations in which this two-pronged test'0° could be satisfied, there
would be a 'strong causal link' between the defendant's actions and
the damage" experienced by the plaintiff. 0 7 Such causal link, in the
view of the court, would justify the imposition of liability upon the
defendant.'01 Upon review of the Lewis record, the court concluded
that both prongs of the compelled self-publication test had been
met.' °9 The plaintiffs' need to obtain new employment, coupled with

100. 361 N.W.2d at 884.
101. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 891, 892. The reason for the nullification of the
punitive damages awards will be discussed later herein. See infra note 118. The
supreme court also upheld the verdicts for the plaintiffs on their breach of contract
claims. 389 N.W.2d at 891.
102. The court phrased the issue as "whether a defendant can ever be held
liable for a defamation when the statement in question was published to a third
person only by the -plaintiff." Id. at 886.
103. Id.
104. The cases relied upon by the Lewis court are among those cited herein
supra note 79. For discussion of the cases, see infra text accompanying notes 13670.
105. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886.
106. This test is what is signified when reference is made later herein to the
compelled self-publication test.
107. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 887. The "strong causal link" language came from
McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 797, 168 Cal. Rptr.
89, 94 (1980), a factually similar case upon which the Lewis court relied heavily.
See 389 N.W.2d at 886, 887. McKinney will be discussed later herein. See infra text
accompanying notes 153-62.
108. See id. at 888. In cases in which both prongs of the test are met, "the
damages are fairly viewed as the direct result of the originator's actions." Id. at
888.
109. Id. In addition, the court resolved, in favor of the plaintiffs, the crucial
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their obligation to be truthful in responding to prospective employers'
requests for information concerning why the plaintiffs' previous
employment was terminated, constituted compulsion sufficient to
satisfy the first prong of the newly adopted test. 10 The test's second
prong also was satisfied because the evidence revealed Equitable's
awareness of the likelihood that the plaintiffs would be asked these
questions by prospective employers."'
Although the court quickly dismissed defendant's argument that
the compelled self-publication doctrine should not be recognized
because such a rule would allow a means of subverting Minnesota's
supposed rejection of the tort of wrongful discharge, 1 2 the court's
adoption of the compelled self-publication doctrine was not without
hesitation. It observed that the doctrine "should be cautiously applied" because of its possible tendency to expand defendants' liability

determination of whether the defendant's stated reason for the plaintiffs' terminations was both defamatory and false. Although the opinion contained no express
declaration that citing "gross insubordination" as the reason for termination amounted
to a defamatory statement because it would lower the impression third parties would
have of the persons about whom such statement was made, the tone of the entire
opinion clearly indicates that such was the court's view. See id. at 882, 886-88.
Marginally more difficult for the court was the question whether there had
been a false statement for which the defendant could be held accountable. Recognizing the rule that a defamatory statement is not actionable unless it is false, id.
at 888, the court found it necessary to resolve the parties' conflicting views concerning
the truth or falsity matter. The defendant took the position that it could not be
held liable for defamation because the plaintiffs' statements that they had been
terminated for gross insubordination constituted true and correct statements of the
reason given by the defendant for the terminations. Id. The plaintiffs, on the other
hand, urged that what is relevant, for purposes of the truth or falsity determination,
is the statement's underlying implication-that the plaintiffs in fact had been grossly
insubordinate. Id. Accepting the plaintiffs' view, the court held that the truth or
falsity of the underlying implication is the pertinent inquiry. Id. at 884. It noted
the record's ample support for the jury's finding of falsity in the statement that the
plaintiffs had engaged in gross insubordination. Id.
110. Id. at 888. The court observed that when prospective employers asked
the questions, the plaintiffs' "only choice would be to tell them 'gross insubordination' or to lie. Fabrication, however, is an unacceptable alternative." Id.
111. Id. As a manager for the defendant admitted at trial, it was foreseeable
that the plaintiffs would be asked, by prospective employers, why they were
discharged from their previous employment. Id.
112. Id. at 887. The court employed language tending to convey the impression
that prior Minnesota law had not necessarily shut the door on the tort of wrongful
discharge. Id. at 887-88. It also reasoned that regardless of whether wrongful
discharge was recognized as actionable, the plaintiffs should not be prohibited from
pursuing their defamation claims simply because such claims arose in the context
of employment terminations. Id. at 888.
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noted that in a compelled selfmust not merely repeat, to the
and defamatory statement. The
to inform the third party of the

actual nature of the situation and must attempt to contradict the
defendant's statement." 4 The purpose of doing so would be to
mitigate damages." 5
The Lewis court resolved two other issues in an apparent attempt
to keep the adoption of the compelled self-publication doctrine from
tipping the scales too far in favor of discharged employees. First,
rejecting the plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, the court held that
in a case involving compelled self-publication, the defendant employer
is entitled to a conditional privilege on the same basis that the
defendant would be entitled to such privilege in a standard defamation suit. 116 Second, the court ruled that punitive damages are not
available in a defamation action based upon compelled self-publica-

113. Id. According to the court, if the doctrine is applied properly, it will not
substantially expand the liability of defendants and will not unreasonably hinder
free expression of views. Id. But see id. at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting) (expressing
view that satisfying both prongs of the compelled self-publication test will be a
simple task in employment termination-related defamation suits).
114. Id. at 888. The plaintiffs in Lewis did attempt to explain the actual
situation. Id. at 882.
115. Id. at 888. The court's majority was considerably less concerned about
the matter of mitigation of damages than was a dissenting justice, who argued that
adoption of the compelled self-publication rule would discourage plaintiffs from
attempting to mitigate damages. Id. at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting). Such justice
noted, as an example, that the plaintiffs in Lewis originally had sought declaratory
relief in the form of an order that the references to "gross insubordination" be
expunged from their employment records, but that they "chose to dismiss this claim
for declaratory relief because expungement would lower, if not eliminate, recovery
of future defamation damages." Id.
116. Id. at 889. An employer typically operates under the shield of a conditional privilege when making statements about a former employee to a prospective
employer of the individual. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54. Therefore,
the Lewis court reasoned that if such a privilege would attach to the former
employer's direct communication of his statement to prospective employers, it would
make "little sense [in the compelled self-publication case] to deny the privilege where
the identical communication is made to identical third parties with the only difference
being the mode of publication." Id. at 890. Even though Equitable was entitled to
a conditional privilege, the court concluded that the protection afforded by such
privilege was forfeited because the record adequately demonstrated Equitable's abuse
of the privilege. Id. at 890, 891. In reaching such conclusion, the court determined
that common law malice (rather than actual malice), see supra note 64, was the
appropriate standard for abuse of the privilege, at least in the employment termination setting. Id. at 891.
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tion.1 7 Both the conditional privilege holding and the punitive damages holding were designed to encourage employers to continue to
inform employees of the reasons for their discharge from employment, despite the adoption of the compelled self-publication doc-

trine. 118
No discussion of the Lewis decision would be complete without
mention of a recently enacted Minnesota statute whose effect will be
to restrict the ability of some, but not all, discharged employees to
rely on the compelled self-publication doctrine as part of a defamation claim. The statute' 1 9 was enacted during the 1987 legislative
session, in apparent reaction to the holding of Lewis.12 0 It specifies
that if an involuntarily terminated employee 2' makes a written request, within five working days following his termination, to his
former employer122 asking about the reason for his termination, the

117. Id. at 892.
118. See id. at 890, 892. With regard to the extension of the conditional
privilege to compelled self-publication cases, the court noted that there is a strong
public interest in making employment-related information readily available to discharged employees and prospective employers. Id. at 890. The court registered its
concern that "unless a significant privilege is recognized by the courts, employers
will decline to inform employees of the reasons for discharges." Id. The elimination
of punitive damages from compelled self-publication cases was thought .to be justified
not only to avoid deterring employers from informing employees of why they were
discharged, id. at 892, but also to avoid situations in which plaintiffs could be
inclined to engage in self-publication for the purpose of seeking a possible windfall
in damages. See id.
Apparently believing that the recognition of the conditional privilege and the
elimination of punitive damages would do little to eliminate what he perceived as a
pernicious effect of the majority's recognition of the compelled self-publication
doctrine, a dissenting justice remarked that "[n]ow, the only way an employer can
avoid litigation and the possible liability for substantial damages, is to cease
communicating the reason it felt justified the termination, not only to third persons,
but even to the employee himself or herself." Id. at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
The Minnesota legislature, considering its recent adoption of legislation pertaining
to defamation suits stemming from the employment termination setting, may have
shared such view. See infra text accompanying notes 119-35.
119. Act of May 11, 1987, ch. 76, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 219 (West) (to
be codified at MINN. STAT. secs. 181.931-.935) (effective Aug. 1, 1987).
120. See Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17.
121. "Employee" is defined in the statute as "a person who performs services
for hire in Minnesota for an employer." Act of May 11, 1987, ch. 76, sec. 1, 1987
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 219 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. sec. 181.931). The
statutory definition of "employee" specifically excludes independent contractors. Id.
122. "Employer" is defined in the statute as "any person having one or more
employees in Minnesota . . . includ[ing] the state and any political subdivision of
the state." Id.

1987]

DEFAMATION IN EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGE

251

employer must provide the terminated employee a written statement
23
of "the truthful reason" for the termination.'
Of significance with regard to the compelled self-publication doctrine is the portion of the statute stating that "[n]o communication
of the statement furnished by the employer to the employee under
subdivision 1 [the subdivision whose provisions are summarized in
the immediately preceding sentence] may be made the subject of any
action for libel, slander, or defamation by the employee against the
employer."'24 The statutory language just quoted seems intended to
quell the fear that the compelled self-publication holding of Lewis
would lead to widespread decisions by employers to remain completely silent, even as to the discharged employees themselves, concerning reasons for the terminations of employees.12 5 Discharged
employees' ability to rely on the compelled self-publication doctrine
clearly has been curtailed by the statute, 126 but it would not be wise
to conclude that Lewis has been legislatively overruled. Although
compelled self-publication now cannot be relied upon in Minnesota
by a plaintiff who wishes to claim that he was defamed by the
content of a written notice he requested, and his employer gave,
pursuant to the statutory provisions,1 27 the statute stops short of
2 8
abolishing the compelled self-publication doctrine.

123. Id. Sec. 3, at 220-21 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. sec. 181.933). The
written notice is to be supplied within five working days following the employer's
receipt of the employee's request. Id. The statute prescribes civil penalties for
imposition on employers who violate the statute's notice provisions. Id. sec. 5, at
221 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. sec. 181.935).
124. Id. Sec. 3 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. sec. 181.933).
125. This fear was expressed by the Lewis majority, 389 N.W.2d at 890, 892,
and emphasized by a dissenting justice. Id. at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting). Although
the majority's holdings concerning conditional privilege and punitive damages, see
supra note 118, were designed to keep the feared danger from becoming reality,
such cautionary steps apparently were not enough for Minnesota's legislators.
126. Even though the statutory language quoted in the text, see supra text
accompanying note 124, contains no express mention of it, the compelled selfpublication scenario logically must be viewed as swept within the statute's broad
statement that "[njo communication furnished by the employer to the employee
under subdivision 1" may be the subject of a defamation action. Act of May 11,
1987, ch. 76, sec. 3, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 221 (to be codified at MINN.
STAT. sec. 181.933).
127. See id.
128. If the legislature had chosen to implement a complete prohibition of the
use of the compelled self-publication doctrine in defamation suits brought by
discharged employees against former employers, it could have done so rather easily
with appropriate language. Instead, however, the legislature chose to restrict its
prohibition of defamation claims to those based upon statements given by the
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The compelled self-publication doctrine of Lewis should remain
available for discharged employee plaintiffs to rely upon in various
situations not covered by the statute, assuming, of course, that there
was a false and defamatory statement involved and that the elements
of the compelled self-publication test 29 can be met. Among such
situations would be those involving statements comparable to the
following: (1.) a statement by the employer, to the discharged employee, of the reason for the employment termination, without the
employee's having requested such statement pursuant to the statute
(meaning that the statement was not what hereinafter will be referred
to as a"statutory statement"); 30 (2.) a statement by the employer,
again to the discharged employee, with such statement being separate
and apart from a statutory statement;' (3.) a statement that ostensibly was a statutory statement but did not contain the "truthful"
reason for the termination;3 2 and, (4.) a statutory statement that

employer "under subdivision 1." Id. Sec. 3, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 221 (to
be codified at MINN. STAT. sec. 181.933). The provisions of such subdivision are
summarized in supra text accompanying notes 121-23. If, however, the statement
was not given "under subdivision 1," the statute's prohibition of defamation claims
should not apply. See infra text accompanying notes 129-34 and infra notes 130-31.
129. See supra text accompanying note 105.
130. If the employer's statement was made without the employee's request for
a statement of the reason for the termination, the statement was not made "under
subdivision I," because that subdivision specifically contemplates a request by the
employee. See Act of May 11, 1987, ch. 76, sec. 3, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at
220-21 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. sec. 181.933). Therefore, the statute's
prohibition of defamation claims involving compelled self-publication should not be
triggered. See supra note 126.
131. Even if a statutory statement is made, a second (presumably volunteered)
statement by the employer could be actionable on the basis of compelled selfpublication because the second statement, not having been requested by the employee,
would not be a statement "under subdivision 1." See supra text accompanying notes
121-23. It would seem, however, that the second statement should not be actionable
unless it stated something different from or additional to what was contained in the
statutory statement, rather than being merely a repetition of the contents of the
statutory statement.
132. The statute specifically requires that the employer's statement contain the
"truthful reason" for the employee's termination. Act of May 11, 1987, ch. 76,
sec. 3, 1987 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 221 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. sec.
181.933). The legislature's decision to use the word truthful may be cause for
confusion, in view of defamation law's basic requirement that the offending statement be false, see supra text accompanying note 32, and the notion that in an
employment termination-based defamation action, the relevant truth or falsity inquiry
pertains to the underlying implication of the defendant's stated reason for the
termination rather than to whether the defendant actually relied upon the stated
reason as the basis for the dismissal. See supra note 109. Despite the use of the
word truthful, the statute should not be read as indicating that if the underlying
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went beyond such "truthful" reason and mentioned other matters.' 33
In addition, it is possible that a court could allow the use of the
compelled self-publication doctrine where the discharged employee
requested a statement pursuant to the statute and the employer's
giving of it was in some other respect at variance with the terms of
the statute. 3 4 Regardless of the applicability of Lewis in Minnesota

implication of the reason set forth in the statutory statement is not truthful, the
employer will be held liable for defamation. To read the statute in such fashion
would be to allow the employer even less protection than is afforded by the
conditional privilege traditionally given the employer in the employment termination
setting. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55. Because the statute seems designed
to give employers broad protection from defamation liability, the statute's reference
to truthful reason almost certainly was not intended to mean truthfulness of the
underlying implication of the reason stated. Instead, the legislature must have
intended, by the reference to truthful reason, to require that the reason stated be
the actual reason relied upon by the employer as the basis for the dismissal, regardless
of whether the underlying implication of the stated reason was true or false. The
legislature's use of the word truthful, therefore, is different from what ordinarily is
contemplated by the use of the word in connection with defamation law.
With this note's extended preliminary discussion as an explanatory backdrop,
the assertion in the text to which this note is appended may be restated as follows:
if what otherwise would be a statutory statement sets forth a reason for termination
that was not actually the basis for the termination, the statute's prohibition of
defamation claims (and hence its prohibition of the use of the compelled selfpublication doctrine) should not apply because the statutory requirements were not
satisfied by the employer. In this event, the discharged employee should be expected
to carry the difficult, but not necessarily insurmountable, burden of proving that
the stated reason for termination was a mere subterfuge.
133. Because the Minnesota statute seems designed to encourage employers to
disclose to discharged employees the reasons for their terminations, see supra text
accompanying note 125, and to shield such employers from defamation liability
where they have disclosed the actual reasons on which they relied in ordering the
dismissals, see supra note 132, the protection from liability would not seem justified
with regard to additional false and defamatory statements that go beyond the actual
reasons for discharge. It should be noted, however, that if the discharged employee
wishes to bring a defamation suit against the former employer on the basis of such
additional statements and wishes to rely upon the compelled self-publication doctrine,
the discharged employee may have some difficulty proving the "strong compulsion"
prong of the compelled self-publication test. See supra text accompanying notes 10305. That is because there may not have been a compulsion to reveal the additional
statements, if, for instance, the prospective employer asked only what the reason
was for the termination of the previous employment. On the other hand, if the
prospective employer insisted upon seeing the written statement the former employer
provided to the discharged employee pursuant to the statute, and the prospective
employer thereupon read not only the stated reason for discharge but also the
additional false and defamatory statements, the plaintiff probably would be able to
prove the strong compulsion element. Even so, the plaintiff also would have to
prove the foreseeability of his being compelled to produce the written statement
itself. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
134. It is conceivable, for example, that courts could regard an employer as
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today, the decision's recognition of the compelled self-publication
doctrine seems likely to be significant to courts in other jurisdictions.35
B.

The Forerunners of Lewis

Although Lewis may become the most influential of the compelled
self-publication decisions, it clearly was not the first of its kind. In
reaching its conclusion in Lewis, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
relied heavily upon earlier decisions'3 6 from intermediate appellate
courts in Georgia,' 3 7 California, 3 ' and Michigan.' 3 9 The earliest of
4
the cases, relied upon in Lewis, was Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett,10
in which the Georgia Court of Appeals took the significant step of
authorizing the use, in an employment discharge-related defamation
action, of a theory bearing the earmark of the compelled self14
publication doctrine. '

Colonial Stores arose against the backdrop of certain WarManpower Commission regulations that required employers to give
discharged employees a certificate of availability at the time of
discharge.' 42 These regulations also stated that an employer could not
hire a worker unless the worker presented either a particular government-issued document or a certificate of availability obtained from

having forfeited the statutory protection from liability by providing an oral statement
instead of a written one or by providing a statement after the expiration of the time
provisions contained in the statute. See Act of May 11, 1987, ch. 76, sec. 1, 1987
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 221 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. sec. 181.933). In such
situations, however, courts could be inclined to determine that the employer substantially complied with the statute and therefore is entitled to its protections, with
the discharged employee's exlusive remedy being the civil penalty provisions the
statute provides for imposition, on a per day basis, on employers who fail to provide
notice in compliance with the statute. See id. sec. 5 (to be codified at MIrN. STAT.
sec. 181.935).
135. As previously noted, Lewis is significant because, as a decision of a
state's highest court, it is a rarity among the decisions dealing with the compelled
self-publication doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
136. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886-87.
137. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946).
138. McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1980).
139. Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969).
140. 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946).
141. See id. at 840-41, 38 S.E.2d at 307-08. Colonial Stores appears to be the
first appellate decision to approve the use of the self-publication doctrine in an
employment termination-based defamation suit.
142. Id. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307.
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his previous employer. 43 The plaintiff in Colonial Stores presented
to prospective employers the required certificate of availability.'" The
certificate, prepared by the plaintiff's former employer, contained an
allegedly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff.1 45 After
prospective employers refused to hire the plaintiff because of the
statement contained in the certificate, the plaintiff brought a defamation action against the former employer.'" Because the defendant
had not directly communicated any false and defamatory statements
about the plaintiff to third parties, it was necessary for the court to
47
determine whether publication had taken place.
Laying part of the foundation for what later cases 48 would fashion
into the compelled self-publication test, 49 the Colonial Stores court
reasoned that where the defendant's statements concerning the plaintiff were disclosed to third parties by the plaintiff, there may still
have been publication if the defendant "intended or had reason to
suppose" that such disclosure by the plaintiff would take place. 50
The court emphasized that such a rule should be especially applicable
where the plaintiff's disclosure "arose from necessity."', 51 Because
the facts demonstrated that the plaintiff was required to show prospective employers the certificate containing the offending statement
and that the defendant was aware the plaintiff would be so required,

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. 38 S.E.2d at 308. The certificate stated that the plaintiff's employment
had been terminated because of his "improper conduct toward fellow employees."
Id. The court was satisfied that the record sufficiently established the falsity of such
statement's implications. Id. at 842, 38 S.E.2d at 309.
146. Id. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 308. The court viewed the evidence as ample to
sustain a finding that the false and defamatory statement in the certificate was the
sole reason prospective employers refused to hire the plaintiff. Id.
147. Id. at 839, 38 S.E.2d at 307.
148. E.g., Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886, 888; McKinney v. County of Santa
Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 796, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94 (1980).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
150. 73 Ga. App. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307 (quoting 36 C.J.S. Libel & Slander
§ 172, at 1225). Such requirement is similar to the foreseeability prong of the
compelled self-publication test as enunciated in Lewis. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at
886. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
151. 73 Ga. App. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307 (quoting 36 C.J.S. Libel & Slander
§ 172, at 1225). But see Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254
(1981), to be discussed infra note 243. Although Colonial Stores did not explicitly
require necessity of disclosure as a prerequisite to application of the self-publication
doctrine, the Lewis decision, with its references to compulsion to disclose, see 389
N.W.2d at 886, 888, has done so. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
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the court concluded there was publication for which the defendant
52
should be held accountable.
Another of the decisions deemed persuasive by the Supreme Court
54
of Minnesota in Lewis 5 ' was McKinney v. County of Santa Clara.
Faced with a fact situation in which the discharged employee plaintiff,
rather than the defendant former employer, had disclosed to prospective employers the defendant's allegedly false and defamatory
statement of reasons for the termination of the plaintiff's employment,'55 the McKinney court concluded that the trial court had erred
in granting summary judgment to the defendant. 15 6 Cases like Colonial Stores convinced the court of the inappropriateness of a blanket
rule of no publication if the plaintiff was the party who communi15 7
cated the defendant's statements to third parties.
McKinney's rejection of such a blanket rule involved the taking
of a meaningful step toward solidifying the compelled self-publication
test. The court expressly required, as one of the prerequisites to use
of the theory, that the plaintiff must have been under a "strong
compulsion" to disclose to a third party the defendant's false and
defamatory statement.' 58 In doing so, the McKinney court spoke
more clearly than did the Colonial Stores court, whose approach left
some uncertainty about whether a necessity or compulsion to disclose
was a requirement for use of the self-publication doctrine or instead
something not required but clearly helpful to the plaintiff in his
attempt to rely on such doctrine. 5 9 Under the McKinney formulation
of the requirements for the use of the self-publication doctrine, there
must have been not only such strong compulsion to disclose but also
a reasonable foreseeability to the defendant that the plaintiff would

152. 73 Ga. App. at 840-41, 38 S.E.2d at 308. Thus, there was a causal
connection between the defendant's statements and the resulting damage to the
plaintiff. See id. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307. Although the court expressed its
assumption that a former employer would be entitled to a conditional privilege in
circumstances such as those presented by the case, id. at 842, 38 S.E.2d at 309, it
concluded that any such privilege had been abused, and accordingly was forfeited,
because the evidence demonstrated malice on the part of the defendant. Id. The
jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff therefore was upheld. Id.
153. See 389 N.W.2d at 887.
154. 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980).
155. Id. at 792-93, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
156. Id. at 798, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
157. See id. at 796-97, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
158. Id. at 796, 798, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51 and supra note 151.
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16
be under such compulsion. 16 The compelled self-publication test, 1
62
as set forth in the Lewis decision, consists of the same requirements. 1

The third of the decisions on which the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Lewis, placed significant reliance 163 was Grist v. Upjohn
Co.164 This case involved an allegedly slanderous statement made by
the defendant former employer to the discharged employee plaintiff
concerning the reasons for her termination. The plaintiff then repeated the reasons to prospective employers. 165 With regard to whether
publication could have taken place under the circumstances, the Grist
court noted that where the maker of false and defamatory statements
"intends or has reason to suppose that in the ordinary course of
events the matter will come to the knowledge of some third person,
a publication may be effected."' 166 The court did not expressly mandate, as a requirement for applicability of the self-publication theory,
that the plaintiff have been under compulsion to make the disclosure
to a third party. 161 Considering the importance the Lewis decision
160. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 798, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94, 94- 95. The court
reasoned that publication by the plaintiff under such circumstances was publication
for which the defendant should be held accountable, because of the "strong causal
link" between the original statement by the defendant and the damage ultimately
experienced by the plaintiff. Id. at 797, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94. Such observation,
which had been expressed in similar form in Colonial Stores, see 73 Ga. App. at
840, 38 S.E.2d at 307, was seized upon by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
support of its compelled self-publication holding in Lewis. See 389 N.W.2d at 887.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
162. 389 N.W.2d at 886, 888. It is apparent from an examination of the Lewis
opinion that as between the McKinney and Colonial Stores decisions, McKinney was
more significant to the Lewis court when it came time for the court to construct a
verbal formulation of the compelled self-publication test. See id. at 886, 887.
163. See id. at 887.
164. 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969).
165. Id. at 485, 168 N.W.2d at 392.
166. Id. 168 N.W.2d at 406.
167. A subtle but meaningful difference between the self-publication approach
of Lewis and McKinney and the self-publication approach of Grist is that the former
approach, consistent with its requirement of compulsion, focuses on the foreseeability
of the compulsion to disclose (and necessarily the foreseeability of the disclosure
itself), whereas the latter approach focuses only on the foreseeability of the disclosure. Certain disclosures that would be foreseeable would not necessarily involve a
foreseeable compulsion. For additional discussion of the notion just expressed, see
infra text accompanying notes 296-97 and infra note 296.
It should be noted that even though the Grist court did not expressly require
a showing that the plaintiff's disclosure was in some way compelled, the court did
mention the facts of the Colonial Stores case. 16 Mich. App. at 485, 168 N.W.2d
at 405-06. The case had involved a necessity for the plaintiff to disclose the
defendant's defamatory statement to third parties. 73 Ga. App. 839, 840, 38 S.E.2d
306, 307.
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later placed on the compulsion requirement, 16 it is reasonable to
conclude that for the Lewis court, the significance of Grist lay not
in the case's statement of what is necessary for an actionable selfpublication but in its implicit recognition 169 of the importance of
rejecting a rigid rule that the defendant may never be held liable for
170
the consequences of a publication by the plaintiff.
C.

Other Decisions Approving the Self-Publication Doctrine

With regard to the remaining employment discharge-related defamation cases in which some form of self-publication has been regarded as actionable, there appears to be a division between courts
that expressly require a compulsion to disclose as an element of an
actionable self-publication and courts that seem to focus more on
the foreseeability of the disclosure, without clearly requiring that the
disclosure have been compelled.17 Bretz v. Mayer,17 cited but not
1 73
discussed in other self-publication decisions described earlier herein,
is the oldest of the remaining cases in which the court insisted on
the compulsion requirement. 74 The case involved a libel claim arising
out of a letter sent to the plaintiff under circumstances that amounted
to the virtual equivalent of an employment termination. 175 The publication, if any, of the allegedly libelous letter had been by the
76
plaintiff himself when he disclosed the letter to third parties.
Refusing to set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, 177 the Bretz
court held that a plaintiff's disclosure to third parties of the defen-

168. See 389 N.W.2d at 886-88.
169. See 16 Mich. App. at 485, 168 N.W.2d at 405-06.
170. See 389 N.W.2d at 886-88.
171. Such division is the same one exemplified by the Lewis and McKinney
decisions on the one hand and the Grist and (perhaps) Colonial Stores decisions on
the other. See supra notes 151, 167.
172. 1 Ohio Misc. 59, 203 N.E.2d 665 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1963).
173. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886; McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 94. Bretz may have been more influential than such other courts
wished to acknowledge openly, however. See infra notes 179-80.
174. See 1 Ohio Misc. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 669.
175. The plaintiff was a minister who claimed he had been defamed in a letter
sent to him by a church association. Such association apparently was in the nature
of a governing body for the denomination to which his congregation belonged. Id.
at 62, 63, 203 N.E.2d at 667, 668. The letter purported to expel the plaintiff from
the church organization administered by such association. Id.
176. Id. at 63, 203 N.E.2d at 668. The persons to whom the plaintiff showed
the offending letter were in the process of trying to organize a new church for
which they wanted the plaintiff to serve as pastor. Id.
177. Id. at 68, 203 N.E.2d at 672.
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dant's false and defamatory statement about him may constitute
publication for which the defendant is accountable "where the defendant has reason to believe that the plaintiff will be under strong
compulsion to show the libelous letter to third persons after he has
read it."'' 7 This language appears to have been the true, though not
necessarily clearly acknowledged, source of similar language in the
179
previously discussed cases of McKinney v. County of Santa Clara
and Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y 80 Thus, Bretz may not
have received all of the credit to which it is entitled.
Belcher v. Little,'8' decided in 1982 by the Supreme Court of Iowa,
also stands among the cases requiring compulsion to disclose as a
prerequisite to an actionable self-publication. 8 2 Although the case
involved a slander of title action that had no connection with an
employment termination,'83 the decision is discussed here because it
justifies the conclusion that Iowa would recognize the compelled selfpublication doctrine in an employment discharge-related defamation
suit. Such conclusion stems from Belcher's reliance on certain of the
decisions discussed earlier herein'8 4 in support of its holding that
publication by the plaintiff is not actionable against the defendant
unless the plaintiff was under a "strong compulsion" to make the
disclosure and it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff
would be under such compulsion.8 5

178. Id. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 669. The court was satisfied that the evidence
demonstrated the existence of the elements of such test. Id. at 67-68, 203 N.E.2d
at 670-71.
179. See 110 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. Bretz was cited,
along with other cases, as tending to support McKinney's statement of the compelled
self-publication test. Id. Nevertheless, Bretz was not given the special mention given
to other relevant cases, see id. at 796-97, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94, even though such
statement in McKinney was a virtual quotation of the Bretz formulation of the
compelled self-publication test. Perhaps the McKinney court was reluctant to advertise what must have been heavy reliance on Bretz because Bretz was a decision
of a state trial court rather than an appellate court.
180. See 389 N.W.2d at 886. The Lewis court cited Bretz as a case tending
to provide general support for such court's compelled self-publication holding, see
id. but did not discuss the case. Given Lewis's expressly acknowledged reliance on
McKinney, id. at 887, and McKinney's largely unacknowledged reliance on Bretz,
see supra note 179, the significance of Bretz is greater than what one ordinarily
would expect to be the significance of a decision of a state trial court.
181. 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982).
182. See id. at 738.
183. See id. at 735-37.
184. The court cited and discussed Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga.
App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946), and McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.
App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980). See Belcher, 315 N.W.2d at 737-38.
185. 315 N.W.2d at 738.
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The Belcher court found defective an instruction that allowed the
jury to find publication in connection with the plaintiff's disclosures
of the defendant's statements if the defendant "knew or should have
known" that the defendant's statements would come to the attention
of a third party. 8 6 Such a forseeability oriented instruction was
inadequate because in addition to a foreseeability element, an element
of strong compulsion to disclose was necessary. 8 7 The court's apparent concern was that without such a compulsion requirement,
there could be created an undesirable legal climate'88 in which plaintiffs might feel encouraged to "create their own causes of action"
by communicating the defendants' statements to third parties. 8 9
Poison v. Davis'90 completes the group of cases in which an element
of compulsion has been regarded as a requirement of an actionable
self-publication. 9 Poison presented what should now be a familiar
scenario: the plaintiff, who had been terminated from her employment, repeated to prospective employers an allegedly false and defamatory statement made by the defendant former employer
92
concerning why she had been discharged from her employment.
Unlike the statements of the compulsion requirement in some of the
previously discussed decisions, 93 Poison's recognition of a compul-

186. Id.
187. Id. In doing so, the court took a step that distanced itself from the
courts that would appear to allow publication by the plaintiff to be actionable in
situations in which such disclosure was foreseeable but not necessarily compelled by
the circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51, 159, 166-67. See also
infra text accompanying notes 203-38 (discussion of cases in which compulsion not
required in order for there to be an actionable self publication). The Belcher opinion
also referred to a need for "substantial evidence" to support an allegation of
compulsion, 315 N.W.2d at 738, but the court did not make clear whether it really
meant to require, with regard to the compulsion element, a standard of proof
greater than a preponderance of the evidence.
188. See id. at 737-38.
189. Id. at 738.
190. 635 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Kan. 1986).
191. See id. at 1147.
192. Id. at 1136, 1147. The allegedly false and defamatory statement, which
was contained in a notice of termination placed by the defendants in the plaintiff's
personnel file, consisted of a notation that the plaintiff's employment had been
terminated because of her "unprofessional conduct." Id. at 1136. When prospective
employers asked the plaintiff the reason her employment with the defendant ended,
the plaintiff revealed the defendant's stated reason "rather than be untruthful to
her potential employers." Id.
193. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886, 888; McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 796,
798, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94; Bretz, 1 Ohio Misc. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 669; Belcher,
315 N.W.2d at 738.
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sion requirement was more implicit than explicit. In the course of
denying the defendant's 94 motion for summary judgment on the
defamation claim,' 95 the court analyzed the publication issue in a
manner that effectively was the same as the compelled self-publication
analysis of previously decided cases, 196 but without citation or discussion of any of such cases and without adoption of the cases'
97
verbal formulations of the compelled self-publication test.
The court reasoned, in Polson, that when the plaintiff informed
propective employers of the defendant's stated reason for terminating
her employment, she did so under circumstances that kept such
disclosures from being "truly voluntary."'' 9 Instead, according to
the court, the plaintiff "was effectively coerced into repeating the
defendant's accusation of 'unprofessional conduct."'"99 Such coercion
stemmed from her need to obtain new employment and her obligation
to be truthful in dealing with prospective employers. 2 0 Therefore,

194. In addition to the city by which the plaintiff had been employed, a
person employed by such city was named as a defendant. See 635 F. Supp. at 1136.
195. Id. at 1153-54. The plaintiff's complaint also included a variety of
contract, tort, constitutional, and statutory claims. See id. at 1136.
196. See id.at 1136, 1147.
197. Although the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (1986) did not come until approximately
two months after Poison was decided, the court of appeals' opinion in Lewis, 361
N.W.2d 875 (Minn. App. 1985), clearly was available at the time the Poison opinion
was issued.
198. 635 F. Supp. at 1147. The court observed that if the plaintiff's disclosures
of the defendants' statement had been truly voluntary, she would not be entitled to
any recovery for damages allegedly stemming from such disclosures. Id.
199. Id. The court went on to observe that the damages stemming from a
plaintiff's "coerced repetition" of a defendant's defamatory statement about him
are recoverable from the defendant, id. citing as authority Munsell v. Ideal Food
Stores, 208 Kan. 909, 920, 494 P.2d 1063, 1072-73 (1972). Munsell was similar to
a self-publication case in that it involved a signed statement' by a terminated
employee, in which statement the employee "confessed" to certain allegations of
wrongdoing leveled by his former employer. The employee later claimed that he had
been defamed by such statement and that his employer had coerced him into
admitting, in such statement, to the commission of acts he did not commit. Id. at
910-14, 494 P.2d at 1066-69. Among the issues was whether by signing such statement
the terminated employee consented to the making of the allegedly false and defamatory statements and therefore waived his right to pursue a defamation claim based
thereon. Id. at 920, 494 P.2d at 1072-73.
200. 635 F. Supp. at 1147. The court described the plaintiff's dilemma this
way:
Had she not sought other employment, she ran the risk of facing reduced
recovery for failure to mitigate damages. When she did choose to seek other
employment, she had either to repeat the defamatory statement in response
to direct questions or to deceive her potential employers. That she chose the
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the court concluded that the plaintiff's disclosures to third parties
constituted publication chargeable to the defendant.20, Despite Poison's failure to cite or discuss the earlier compelled self-publication
decisions, the court's approach to the publication question effectively
20 2
places such decision within the compelled self-publication camp.
Four other employment-related self-publication decisions, two from
Missouri 2 3 and two from Texas, 204 philosophically are aligned with

previously discussed cases in that they share an awareness of the
need to classify some disclosures by plaintiffs to third parties as
20 5
publications for which the defendant must be held accountable.
Nevertheless, in terms of what is necessary for an actionable selfpublication, the four cases stand in partial contrast 2°6 to most of the
compelled self-publication decisions discussed earlier herein.
The first of the two Missouri decisions was handed down by the
supreme court of that state in 1981. In Herberholt v. dePaul Community Health Center,20 7 the court appeared, in dictum, 208 to recognize
that certain publications by the plaintiff may be actionable against
the defendant. 2 09 The case involved a discharged employee's claim
that he had been defamed by the content of a letter his former
employer gave him concerning his employment termination. 210 The
course of honesty rather than deceit is to be commended, and should not be
made the ground for denying her right to recover on this defamation claim.
Id. (emphasis in original).
201. Id.
202. Poison's reference to "a coerced repetition," id. effectively signifies the
same thing as the compulsion to disclose that is required as one of the elements of
the compelled self-publication test. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
Although the Poison analysis did not involve an express requirement of foreseeability
to the former employer that the plaintiff would have to make the disclosure to third
parties, such other element of the compelled self-publication test seems implicit in
Poison's discussion of the coercion under which the plaintiff was acting. See 635
F. Supp. at 1147.
203. Herberholt v. dePaul Community Health Center, 625 S.W.2d 617 (Mo.
1981), and Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d
822 (Mo. App. 1985).
204. Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985),
and First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
205. See infra text accompanying notes 102-08, 148-57, 168-70, 177-80, 18485, 198-202.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 219-20, 228-29, 235-38.
207. 625 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1981).
208. See infra text accompanying notes 214-15.
209. See 625 S.W.2d at 624-25.
210. Id. at 619-21. The letter was issued to the plaintiff at his request, pursuant
to a Missouri statutory procedure. Id. at 620. The statute obligated employers to
provide discharged employees who so requested a letter setting forth the reason for
the termination of their employment. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1983 Cum.
Supp.).
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plaintiff's position was that the necessary publication had taken place
when the plaintiff himself showed the letter to a prospective employer.21 After noting that ordinarily no publication is considered to
have taken place if the plaintiff himself disclosed the offending
statement to third parties, 212 the court observed that an exception to
the rule sometimes is made "where the utterer of the defamatory
matter intends or has reason to suppose that in the ordinary course
of events the matter will come to the knowledge of some third
person. "213 Although such language appeared to have been inserted
in the opinion as a prelude to a conclusion that the plaintiff's
disclosure to the prospective employer fit within such exception, the
court declined to resolve the publication issue. 1 4 Instead, it proof a
ceeded, on another basis, to uphold the trial court's granting
215
directed verdict in favor of the defendant former employer.
Herberholt's self-publication language statements, 216 which contained no reference to any requirement that the plaintiff have been
under a compulsion to disclose, were seized upon and applied in a
Missouri Court of Appeals decision, Neighbors v. Kirksville College
of Osteopathic Medicine.2 7 Neighbors presented a similar set of
facts. 218 The Herberholt and Neighbors decisions, therefore, seem to

211. 625 S.W.2d at 624.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 624-25 (quoting 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel & Slander § 148, at 655
(1970)). The language quoted in the text is essentially the same as language employed
in the previously discussed cases of Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App.
839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946), and Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 52, 168 N.W.2d
389 (1969). See supra text accompanying notes 148-50, 166.
214. See id. at 625.
215. Id. The court sidestepped the publication question by holding that even
assuming there was publication, the former employer would be protected by a
qualified privilege that had not been overcome. Id. In addition, it was significant
to the court that the plaintiff had failed to establish damages stemming from the
prospective employer's having read the allegedly false and defamatory letter. Id.
The prospective employer had decided not to hire the plaintiff for reasons other
than what was stated in the letter. Id. at 623.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
217. 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. App. 1985).
218. The plaintiff, who had been discharged from her employment, claimed
that she had been defamed in a termination letter issued to her by her former
employer, The College of Osteopathic Medicine. Id. at 823. She had requested the
letter pursuant to a statutory procedure. Id. See supra note 210. The letter stated
that the plaintiff had been discharged because she allegedly had breached the
confidentiality of a patient with whom she had come in contact with during her
employment. The plaintiff claimed that such allegation was untrue, that the former
employer knew the letter was to be used by her as she sought other employment,
and that prospective employers had read the letter when she showed it to them. Id.
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indicate two things: (1.) that in Missouri, self-publication under
appropriate circumstances 219 is actionable against the defendant; and,
(2.) that such appropriate circumstances need not be so compelling
20
as to effectively force the plaintiff to engage in self-publication.
Both of the Texas decisions were from the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals.2 21 In the course of affirming verdicts of substantial amounts
for the respective plaintiffs, 2 2 the courts fashioned a self-publication
approach 223 that is somewhat different from the approaches discussed
earlier herein.2 24 The plaintiff in the first of the two cases, First State
Bank v. Ake, 225 claimed he had been defamed when, after his
resignation as its president, the defendant bank filed a fidelity bond

at 823, 824. In view of these facts, the court concluded that the trial court had
erred in sustaining the former employer's motion to dismiss the defamation claim.
Id. at 825. According to the court, the facts pleaded by the plaintiff, if true, would
call into play the Herberholt statement that the plaintiff's communication of the
defendant's defamatory statement may constitute publication if the defendant intended or had reason to suppose that the statement would be communicated to
third parties. Id. at 824.
219. The appropriate circumstances would be those that the defendant intended
to have occur or had reason to suppose would occur. Herberholt, 625 S.W.2d at
624-25; Neighbors, 694 S.W.2d at 824.
220. The Herberholt-Neighbors approach to self-publication is geared more
toward the foreseeability of the disclosure itself, rather than toward the foreseeability
of any compulsion to disclose. Such an approach, therefore, more closely resembles
that of Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 52, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969) and perhaps
Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946), than it
does that of Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986)
and McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1980). See supra note 171.
221. Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985),
and First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
222. In Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.
1985), the jury had returned a plaintiff's verdict of $650,000 in compensatory
damages and $1,750,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 440. The trial court ordered a
remittitur of $1,500,000 on the punitive damages award, and the Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed. Id. at 448. In First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980), a plaintiff's verdict of $150,000 in compensatory damages and
$300,000 in punitive damages was affirmed. Id. at 702-03.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 228-29.
224. The previously discussed approaches to which reference is made in the
text are: (1.) the approach characterized by application of the compelled selfpublication test, which requires that the plaintiff have been under a strong compulsion to disclose the defendant's false and defamatory statements about him to a
third party, and that it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff would
have been under such compulsion, see supra text accompanying notes 103-05; and,
(2.) the approach characterized by a focus on whether the defendant intended or
had reason to suppose that the plaintiff would disclose the offending statements to
a third party. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50, 166, 212-13.
225. 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985).
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claim asserting that it had experienced losses because of the plaintiff's
dishonesty. 226 Without citing the self-publication cases discussed previously, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the jury
should not have been allowed to award damages pertaining to instances in which the plaintiff himself disclosed the defendant's statement to prospective employers. 22 7 The court held that such
communications constituted publication actionable against the defendant on either of two bases: (1.) that under the circumstances, such
communications to third parties were likely to take place; 22 or, (2.)
that under the circumstances, the defendant should have realized the
existence of "an unreasonable risk" that the defendant's statement
229
would be communicated to third parties.
Following the lead of First State Bank, the court in Chasewood
Constr. Co. v. Rico 230 held that either of the two alternative bases,23'

226. Id. at 698-99.
227. Id. at 701.
228. Id. The court cited as authority RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 577
comment m, but its reliance on such comment seems misplaced. Comment m begins
by stating the general rule that if the defendant communicates the offending statement
directly to the plaintiff and the plaintiff then communicates it to a third party, the
defendant is not liable. Id. Such comment goes on to state that "[ijf the defamed
person's transmission of the communication to the third person was made, however,
without an awareness of the defamatory nature of the matter and if the circumstances
indicated that communication to a third party would be likely, a publication may
properly be held to have occurred." Id. (emphasis supplied). Although the First
State Bank facts supported a conclusion that the plaintiff effectively could not have
avoided disclosing the false and defamatory bond claim to prospective employers,
606 S.W.2d at 701-02, the court seemed to overlook a virtually inescapable conclusion: that when he made such disclosures to prospective employers, the plaintiff
almost certainly knew the defamatory nature of the bond claim. Therefore, comment
m, by its terms, would not be applicable to such facts. The intended application of
such comment is illustrated by accompanying illustrations concerning a blind plaintiff's engaging a third party to read him a letter sent to him by the defendant, and
a plaintiff's engaging a third party to read him a letter sent to him by the defendant
and written in a foreign language with which the plaintiff was not familiar. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 577 comment m, illustrations 10, 11. First State Bank
is not such a case.
229. 606 S.W.2d at 701, 702. The court cited as authority RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7, § 577 comment k. This comment deals with negligent communications by
the defendant, id., such as the defendant's making a defamatory statement in a
voice so loud that other persons in the vicinity are able to hear it, or the defendant's
sending a letter to the plaintiff with the knowledge that in the plaintiff's absence
from his office, his secretary will open and read the plaintiff's mail. See id.
illustrations 4, 6. Again, it is questionable whether First State Bank is the sort of
case to which the comment was intended to apply. See supra note 228.
230. 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
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mentioned in the preceding paragraph, would support a conclusion
that there had been a publication for which the defendant was to be
held accountable.2 3 2 What had happened in Chasewood Constr. was
that the defendant, a general contractor, had "fired" the plaintiff,
a subcontractor, and had ordered the plaintiff to effect an immediate
removal of the plaintiff's employees from the job site. In a direct
communication between the parties, the defendant informed the
plaintiff that his services no longer were desired because in the view
of the defendant, the plaintiff had stolen certain materials. 233 The
plaintiff's defamation claim, which was based upon such false accusation of theft, presented a self-publication issue because the
plaintiff had informed roughly 110 employees at the job site of the
accusation by the defendant and the defendant's termination of the

subcontract. 234
In concluding that the alternative self-publication requirements
developed in First State Bank had been satisfied, the Chasewood
Constr. court employed an analysis that focused on what prompted
2 35
the plaintiff to inform his employees of the defendant's statement.
Such analysis thus resembled the reasoning utilized in the compelled
self-publication cases. 23 6 It may be, therefore, that even though the
Texas decisions' approach to the self-publication question involved
a verbal formulation that is different from the compelled self-publication test, the philosophical kinship 23 7 of the two approaches is
23
such that in their respective applications, they are much the same.
D.

Decisions Rejecting the Self-Publication Doctrine

Despite what has occurred in the cases discussed in the immediately
preceding subsections, the self-publication doctrine has not been
232.
233.
234.

696 S.W.2d at 445-46.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 444.

235.
236.

See id.

See supra text accompanying notes 102-11, 153-62, 172-202.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
238. Even though the two Texas decisions and certain other cases discussed
elsewhere herein have not expressly required a showing that the plaintiff was acting
under a compulsion to disclose the defendant's statements to a third party, see supra
text accompanying notes 148-50, 166, 212-13, 217, the courts' discussions of the
facts of the cases have included mention of circumstances tending to create a
compulsion, necessity, or duty under which the plaintiff made the disclosure. See
Chasewood Constr., 696 S.W.2d at 444; First State Bank, 606 S.W.2d at 701-02;
Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 840-41, 38 S.E.2d 306, 307-08
(1946); Polson v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130, 1136, 1147 (D. Kan. 1986); Neighbors

v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Mo. App.
1985).
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approved by all courts that have been called upon to decide the
2 40
23 9
issue. The doctrine has been rejected either expressly or impliedly
in several employment discharge-related defamation cases. Even in
the decisions in which courts expressly have declined to allow plaintiffs to rely upon the doctrine, there has been a tendency to reach
24
the conclusion in a summary fashion, with little or no analysis. '
Such decisions seem premised on a notion akin to an irrebuttable
presumption that the plaintiff's own communication of the defendant's statements cannot serve as the foundation of a defamation
claim against the defendant. 242 Seldom have courts that have disapproved the self-publication doctrine even acknowledged the existence
of authority to the contrary.2 43 Instead, those courts have seemed

239. See, Vargas v. Royal Bank, 604 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (D. P.R. 1985);
Carson v. S. Ry. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (D.S.C. 1979); Church of Scientology,
Inc. v. Green, 354 F. Supp. 800, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Churchey v. Adolph Coors
Co., 725 P.2d 38, 41 (Colo. App.), cert. granted (Colo. Sept. 29, 1986); Parsons
v. Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 194 So.2d 456, 457 (La. App.), writ refused, 250 La.
536, 197 So.2d 80, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967); Lunz v. Neuman, 48 Wash.2d
26, 33-34, 290 P.2d 697, 701-02 (1-955).
240. See Montgomery v. Big B, Inc., 460 So.2d 1286, 1287 (Ala. 1984);
Hoover v. Livingston Bank, 451 So.2d 3, 5 (La. App. 1984); Cashio v. Holt, 425
So.2d 820, 823 (La. App. 1982).
241. See cases cited supra note 239.
242. See, e.g., Vargas v. Royal Bank, 604 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (D.P.R. 1985);
Carson v. S. Ry. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (D.S.C. 1979); Church of Scientology,
Inc. v. Green, 354 F. Supp. 800, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Parsons v. Gulf & S. Am.
S.S. Co., 194 So.2d 456, 457 (La. App.), writ refused, 250 La. 536, 197 So.2d 80,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967).
243. A rarity among such decisions is Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 725
P.2d 38 (Colo. App.), cert. granted (Colo. Sept. 29, 1986). In that decision, the
court's brief consideration of the plaintiff's self-publication argument contained an
acknowledgement that McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787,
168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980), First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980), and Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 52, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969), had
recognized an exception to the general rule that the defendant is not liable for
damage resulting from the plaintiff's communication of the defendant's statement
to third parties. 725 P.2d at 40. Having mentioned this authority, however, the
court expressed disapproval of it in a cursory manner, noting simply that "[w]e
perceive no sound reason for weakening the general rule by carving out an exception
based on foreseeability in employment termination cases." Id. at 41.
Along a similar line is Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254
(1981), in which the court recognized the existence of certain self-publication
authority while in the course of determining that such doctrine should not apply to
the case being decided. Id. at 49, 279 S.E.2d at 257. The self-publication case noted
in Sigmon was Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306
(1946), which, like Sigmon, was a decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals. Sigmon,
158 Ga. App. at 49, 279 S.E.2d at 257. In Sigmon, the plaintiff had been terminated
from her employment because of her alleged "mishandling of company funds." Id.

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:227

content to consider all such communications voluntary, and hence
not actionable, no matter what the circumstances were. 244 Regardless
of how the self-publication question should be answered, courts'
mechanical rejections of the self-publication doctrine are not particularly useful because they provide essentially no insight concerning
the strengths and weaknesses or advantages and disadvantages of the
doctrine. The next section herein will be devoted to consideration of
matters of that nature.
III.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE COMPELLED

SELF-PUBLICATION DOCTRINE

A.

Significance of the Change Effected

Any attempt to analyze and evaluate the compelled self-publication
doctrine (and its closely related variants) 245 must begin with an

at 48, 279 S.E.2d at 256. When the plaintiff later sought employment elsewhere,
she noted on an application form that her previous employment had been terminated
because of supposed "misappropriation of company funds." Id. at 49, 279 S.E.2d
at 257 (emphasis in original).
In refusing to allow the plaintiff to raise a self-publication claim, the court
stated: "Nor does the fact that in filling out an application [the plaintiff] herself
informed a propective employer that she was terminated by [former employer] for
"misappropriation of company funds" constitute a publication of a libel by her
former employer. In this regard [plaintiff] libeled herself by her own voluntary
action." Id. In an accompanying citation, see id., the court invited a comparison
between the case being decided and the Colonial Stores decision, but it did not
favor readers with analysis of the ways in which the two cases were different. The
court's less than complete explanation of why it would not allow the use of the
self-publication doctrine creates uncertainty. Perhaps it was distinguishing Colonial
Stores because the case involved disclosures made by the plaintiff pursuant to
government regulations and the Sigmon facts did not. Instead, it may have been
focusing on some subtle difference between mishandling of funds and misappropriation of funds, so as to indicate that by using the word misappropriation instead
of the word mishandling in her communication with the prospective employer, the
plaintiff forfeited any ability she otherwise might have had to rely on the compelled
self-publication doctrine. See id. Regardless of what the actual rationale was for the
disapproval of the self-publication doctrine, it is safe to assert that the Sigmon
court's intent was to read Colonial Stores narrowly.
244. See, e.g., Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 49, 279 S.E.2d 254,
257 (1981). See also cases cited supra note 239 (all seemingly, if not expressly,
premised on notion set forth in text).
245. When the term compelled self-publication is used in this article's discussion of such doctrine's weaknesses and strengths, see infra text accompanying notes
253-90, the term is intended to encompass not only the approach taken in the cases
in which the element of compulsion has been required but also the approaches taken
in the cases in which self-publication has been recognized, but without an express
requirement of compulsion. See supra text accompanying note 224.

1987]

DEFAMATION IN EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGE

269

acknowledgement that to the extent such doctrine has been recognized, it effects a significant change in how employment dischargerelated defamation actions have been treated by the courts. Such a
conclusion is inescapable, despite the attempts made, in the influential
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y. decision, to play down the
consequences likely to stem from recognition of the doctrine.2 46 In
the end, the Lewis majority was unable even to convince itself that
the doctrine would not rock the boat noticeably, because it concluded
that certain precautionary measures were needed to accompany adop247
tion of the compelled self-publication rule.
Without question, the doctrine is pro-employee in nature. In states
in which it has been adopted, employers are less free to rely on the
shield provided by the previous, often rigid application of the publication requirement. If the requirements of the compelled selfpublication doctrine2 48 are satisfied, the technical nicety of how third
parties learned of the offending statements is stripped away, leaving
employers to win or lose employment termination-based defamation
suits on the remaining substantive issues of whether the statements
were true or false, whether the statements were defamatory, whether
the statements were subject to a privilege, and whether there was
damage to the plaintiff. Properly applied, the compelled self-publication doctrine should have no effect on the frequency with which
employers prevail on such substantive issues. 249 Nevertheless, even
though employers' chances of success on the issues just noted may
go unaffected, the compelled self-publication doctrine's modification
of the publication requirement is significant enough to produce one
seemingly unavoidable consequence: an increase in the number of
employment discharge-related defamation suits brought against employers. 210 More plaintiffs, at least some of whom previously could
have been deterred from filing suit because of the former application
and effect of the publication requirement, now may be expected to
lodge defamation claims. 25 ' As a result, more employers, regardless
246. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
247. See id. at 889-90, 892. Such precautionary measures were the allowance
of a conditional privilege to the defendant employer on the same basis to which it
would have been entitled to such a privilege in a noncompelled self-publication case,
id. at 889-90, as well as an elimination of plaintiffs' ability to obtain punitive
damages in compelled self-publication cases. Id. at 892.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
249. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
250. Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17.
251. See id. See also Stricharchuk, supra note 10, at 31 (to same general
effect).
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of whether they ultimately are successful in defending against such
claims, will be forced to experience the expense and inconvenience
2
of litigation.1
In order to determine whether the change effected by the compelled
self-publication doctrine is justified and desirable, one must examine
such doctrine's strengths and positive consequences, as well as its
weaknesses and negative consequences. Such an examination is contained in the following two subsections.
B.

The Doctrine's Weaknesses

Despite the legitimacy of the concern about the increased amount
of defamation litigation the compelled self-publication doctrine seems
destined to produce, the doctrine has a more serious weakness that
resembles a strength gone awry. Although, as will be noted later, a
strength of the compelled self-publication rule is its tendency to give
employers greater reason to be certain that their stated basis for
terminating an employee comports with the truth, 53 this strength
easily may be transformed into a glaring weakness. Such transformation occurs when employers choose, as some have and many more
almost certainly will, to avoid the prospect of litigation based uponcompelled self-publication by remaining completely silent, even to
the discharged employee, concerning the reason for the employment

termination .254
For many employers in jurisdictions recognizing compelled selfpublication, conducting a complete investigation into the facts and
then making a truthful statement to the discharged employee will not
seem as effective an insulator from defamation litigation as a policy
of revealing to no one, the discharged employee included, the basis
relied upon in making the termination.2 55 The rationale would be that

252. Of course, with estimates showing that perhaps one-third of all defamation
suits arise out of the employment setting, see Middleton, supra note 10, at 1, the
amount of defamation litigation against employers already was substantial even
without the compelled self-publication doctrine. It is safe to assume that considerably
more employment termination related defamation cases are not of the compelled
self-publication variety than are of such variety. Therefore, despite the strong
likelihood that the compelled self-publication doctrine will quicken the pace at which
defamation claims are filed against employers, such doctrine should be seen as
entering the employment-connected defamation race at a time when the pace already
was rapid rather than at a time when the race participants had yet to pick up speed.
253. See infra text accompanying note 289. The reason referred to in the text
takes the form of a negative incentive: the prospect of liability.
254. Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17; Stricharchuk, supra note 10, at 31.
255. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
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even if the employer's statement to the employee were truthful, the
employer still could have to defend a defamation action based upon
such statement. Defending such a suit is a burden even if the employer
ultimately prevails. If no statement were made to the employee
concerning the reason for the termination, there, of course, would
be no basis for a self-publication claim. Even if the discharged
employee to whom no statement of reason was given would later be
compelled to disclose to a prospective employer that he had been
discharged from his previous employment, the employee would have
no defamation claim against the former employer. The mere act of
discharging an employee, without more, generally cannot constitute
actionable defamation. 2 6 There is growing evidence that as a result
of the compelled self-publication doctrine's increased visibility, attorneys who represent employers are advising their clients to protect
themselves against defamation liability by engaging in the silence just
described 257
Such calculated silence is understandable from the perspective of
employers. Nevertheless, even though silence may afford employers
some measure of protection from defamation suits, it fails to advance
employers' legitimate interest in obtaining information about potential employees so that suitable employees may be hired. This interest
clearly is not furthered by an environment in which employers cannot
gain, from the previous employer2 58 or even the prospective employee
himself, meaningful information shedding light on the former employer's reason for discharging the prospective employee. 259 The

discharged employee is not well-served by such silence either, because
without a statement of the reason he was discharged, the person may

256. See Hicks v. Stone, 425 So.2d 807, 813 (La.App. 1982); Little v. Spaeth,
394 N.W.2d 700, 705 (N.D. 1986). But see Middleton, supra note 10, at 30 (noting
that plaintiffs' attorneys may begin to challenge such rule).
257. Middleton, supra note 10 , at 30, 31; Stricharchuk, supra note 10, at 31.
258. In view of the significant amount of defamation litigation instituted
against employers even without the compelled self-publication doctrine, see supra
note 252, many employers have adopted strict policies concerning information to be
revealed concerning former employees. Under such policies, the only information
given to propective employers is "neutral" information such as the former employee's
name, final job title, and dates of employment. Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17;
Stricharchuk, supra note 10, at 31.
259. See Stricharchuk, supra note 10, at 31. Therefore, there is a price attached
to the protection from defamation liability that employers' calculated silence affords.
The price is a lessened ability to determine the character and competence of an
applicant until after the decision to hire the applicant has been made and he has
begun the new employment. See id.
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be less likely to know how to improve upon upon his performance
in future employment. Employers' tendencies to be silent would be
less strong if courts were to adopt the compelled self-publication
doctrine, requiring that it be accompanied by certain precautionary
measures of the type required in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y.260 and to be discussed later herein.26 Nevertheless, there is no
denying that the doctrine, even when accompanied by such measures,
will cause many employers to be more cautious than they once may
have been concerning what, if anything, to say to employees in
connection with their discharges from employment.
Critics of the doctrine also may claim that, at least in the context
of employment termination-related actions, the elements of the compelled self-publication test will be easily satisfied, meaning that the
doctrine will be held applicable too often. 262 The argument would
proceed as follows: discharged employees will not have difficulty
proving their need to obtain new employment and their obligation
to disclose, to prospective employers, why their previous employment
was terminated. Also, it will not be difficult for discharged employees
to prove that such need and obligation were foreseeable to the former
employer. 263 Although the opposition argument is intially appealing,
any weakness can be eliminated by courts focusing closely on whether,
under the particular facts of the case being decided, there really was
compulsion upon the discharged employee to disclose the particular
offending statement made by the former employer. 26 In addition,
assuming discharged employees frequently are under such compulsion
to disclose the alleged reason for termination and such compulsion
is foreseeable to employers who effect the terminations, this state of
affairs should not lead to a rejection of the compelled self-publication
doctrine on the theory that claims will be proved too easily. Instead,
if the assumptions stated in the preceding sentence are correct, they
would seem to dictate recognition of the legitimacy of the employees'
claims of injury, so as to keep defamation law at least reasonably
in line with the legal concept of holding responsible parties account265
able for the foreseeable consequences of their actions.
260. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d 876. For discussion of these precautionary measures,
see supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
261. See infra text accompanying notes 299-352.
262. Such view was expressed by a dissenting justice in Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at
896 (Kelley, J., dissenting).

263.

See id.

264. For additional discussion of how courts should apply the compulsion
requirement, see infra text accompanying note 298.
265. See infra text accompanying notes 279-81.
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Another criticism that has been levied against the compelled selfpublication rule is that it will tend to discourage discharged employees
from taking steps to mitigate their damages. 266 Such fear is not
groundless, but the chance of it becoming reality with any great
frequency seems small, particularly if courts that approve the use of
compelled self-publication make appropriate mitigation of damages
requirements. As the court properly recognized in the Lewis decision,
discharged employee plaintiffs in these cases should be expected to
take reasonable steps toward mitigation of damages by attempting
to contradict the false and defamatory statement they have been
compelled to repeat and by attempting to explain what they regard
as the true nature of the circumstances or considerations that gave
rise to the former employer's statement.2 67 Appropriate instructions
should apprise the jury of the importance of taking into account any
failure by the plaintiff to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages.
Those who oppose recognition of the compelled self-publication
doctrine point to what they perceive as another negative consequence,
and hence a weakness, of the doctrine. Their general assertion is that
if the doctrine's use is permitted in states in which tort actions for
wrongful discharge heretofore have not been allowed, plaintiffs tend
to view a defamation action based upon self-publication as a suitable
substitute.2 68 More specifically, they argue that if a state does not
recognize tort claims for wrongful discharge, it should prohibit the
use of the compelled self-publication doctrine and thereby prevent
discharged employees from achieving, through a defamation suit,
269
essentially what is sought in a wrongful discharge claim.
Such argument for rejection of the doctrine ignores the difference
between the essence of a tort action for wrongful discharge and the
essence of a defamation claim. By its very nature, a wrongful
discharge action is designed to provide the plaintiff suitable redress
for the loss of employment, where the termination of the plaintiff's
employment was for some reason unlawful. 270 A defamation claim,

266. An argument to such effect was made by the defendant employer in
Lewis, but was rejected by the court. 389 N.W.2d at 888. A dissenting justice
expressed the views that the majority had failed to give adequate attention to such
argument and that the very case being decided involved a decision by the plaintiffs
not to pursue an avenue that if followed, could have served to mitigate their
damages. Id. at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting). See supra note 115.
267. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
268. See Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17.
269. An argument to this effect was raised by the defendant employer in
Lewis, but without success. 389 N.W.2d at 887.
270. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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on the other hand, is designed to enable the plaintiff to obtain
compensation for the loss of reputation.271 The respective losses,

therefore, are different. The allowance of damages on the discharged
employee's defamation claim does not amount to a surreptitious
allowance of the equivalent of a wrongful discharge action, even
though the defamation claim stems from an employment termination
setting. 272 If the facts will support the bringing of a defamation claim,
the discharged employee should be allowed to do so regardless of
whether a tort claim for wrongful discharge is actionable in his state

or warranted under the circumstances.2 73 Properly viewed, the compelled self-publication doctrine is a logical development that does not
go so far as to transform a defamation action into a wrongful
274
discharge substitute.
At least some of the asserted weaknesses of the compelled selfpublication doctrine are difficult to deny, as has been noted. Consideration of such infirmities must be tempered, however, by a
reminder that the adoption of the doctrine has not left employers
completely without protection from defamation liability. Even with
the recognition of compelled self-publication, employers continue,
for instance, to have the formidable shields afforded by the falsity
requirement 275 and the conditional privilege.2 76 It remains uncertain
to what degree defamation law's constitutional aspects apply to the
typical employment discharge-based suit, but the current state of the
law at least leaves open the prospect that employers will be regarded

271. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 111, at 771.
272. Even though the defendant's statement may have been connected in time,
place, and subject with the employee's discharge from employment, the damages
awarded in a defamation suit based thereon would be tied to actual or presumed
harm to the employee's reputation occurring as a result of the statement. See supra
text accompanying notes 38-44. The loss of employment from which he was discharged would not be a proper item of damages in the defamation suit because
such loss would not have stemmed from the false and defamatory statement. Instead,
such loss would have resulted from the allegedly wrongful act of discharging the
employee. It is the statement that may give rise to the defamation claim, with the
act of discharging the employee perhaps giving rise to a wrongful discharge claim.
Thus, the act and the statement are to be viewed separately in terms of the causes
of action created and their corresponding damages.
273. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
274. To the extent that plaintiffs do attempt to use a defamation suit as a
substitute for a wrongful discharge claim, courts should be able to curb such
tendency by maintaining a tight rein on the issues and asserted items of damages.
See supra note 272.
275. See supra text accompanying note 32.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54, 116.
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as entitled to the constitutional protections. 277 In addition, other
protections such as modifications of traditional damages rules have
been effected in favor of employers in compelled self-publication
cases.278

C.

The Doctrine's Strengths

Despite certain undeniable problems associated with the compelled
self-publication doctrine, its strengths dictate a conclusion that the
doctrine merits adoption, but with certain accompanying controls,
limitations, and safeguards to be discussed later. The doctrine's chief
conceptual strength is that it promotes consistency with the sensible
notion, adhered to in other areas of the law, of holding defendants
accountable for the foreseeable consequences of their actions. Such
notion is manifested, for instance, in the causation rules of negligence
law 279 and the damages rules of contract law. 2 0 Furthermore, given

that defamation is an intentional tort and, in connection with some
intentional torts, defendants are held liable for even unforeseeable

277. See supra notes 27-29. Employers conceivably could claim the protection
of another supposed constitutional rule suggested by certain language in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court appeared to
indicate that under the first amendment, statements of pure opinion do not and
cannot give rise to a valid defamation claim. Id. at 339-40. Because such indication
came in the form of dictum, it may be referred to as a "pseudo-rule." LeBel,
Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing Interests
Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. Rv. 249, 275 (1987).
Nevertheless, courts have seized upon the notion and have considered it a binding
constitutional rule. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d, 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). If, however, the supposed statement of
opinion implies the existence of underlying "facts" that are false, the statement is
actionable. See id. at 978-79. The opinion "rule" is unlikely to provide great
protection to employers who seek to rely on it, however, because purported statements of opinion by employers concerning former employees are likely to be seen
as implying the existence of underlying facts and therefore actionable. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1985), in which the court rejected an
argument that the following statement by an employer constituted nonactionable
opinion: "If I let an employee go, it's because either their work or their personal
habits are not acceptable to me. I do not recommend these people." Id. at 81, 86.
278. E.g., Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 892 (eliminating punitive damages as a
possibility in a compelled self-publication action). For other proposed modifications
of the damages rules applicable to such cases, see infra text accompanying notes
336-52.
279. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 281 comments e, f, g; § 435 comment
b.
280. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§
14-5, 14-7 (2d ed. 1977).
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consequences of their actions, 281 it does not seem unreasonable to
apply defamation law in such a fashion that defendants are held
responsible for certain foreseeable consequences stemming from their
statements.
If an employee has been discharged on the basis of a false and
disparaging reason and the employee later is required to disclose the
stated reason to a third party, such as a prospective employer, there
is great potential for injury to the employee. Where it was foreseeable
to the former employer that the employee would be required to repeat
the stated reason, the employee's ability to seek and obtain compensation for the resulting injury should not be sacrificed in the interest
of retaining a rigid publication rule 28 2 that is more concerned with
form than substance. If a former employer is potentially liable when
he makes a false and defamatory statement directly to a prospective
employer of the person who is the subject of such statement, he
should not be able to evade potential liability by claiming he made
such a statement only to the discharged employee and that the
employee disclosed it to a prospective employer (assuming, of course,
the existence of the former employer's reasonable awareness that
such person would be expected and required to disclose such statement to a prospective employer). The potential for harm to the
discharged employee is the same in either event 8 3 and the discharged
employee is also not a wrongdoer in either event. Under circumstances
of compulsion and foreseeability, there should be recognition of the
discharged employee's defamation claim based upon self-publication,
so as to give the substance of the resulting injury precedence over
the form issue of how, and from whom, the prospective employer
learned of the offending statement. 284

281. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 435A, 435B.
282. Le., a rule that the plaintiff's own communication to third parties cannot
be actionable against the defendant. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
283. As the court pointed out in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y.,
389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986), the defendant employer would be the true originator
of the harm ultimately experienced by the plaintiff regardless of whether the employer
made the false and defamatory statement directly to a third party, or, instead, to
the plaintiff under circumstances such that the employer reasonably should have
been aware of the need for the plaintiff to disclose the statement to a third party.
Id. at 888. The defendant employer, as the originator of the harm in either instance,
should be held liable accordingly. Id.
284. Where the circumstances are as noted in the text, the form question
concerning how the false and defamatory statement was communicated to the third
party is not significant enough to override the plaintiff's interest in seeking and
being awarded compensation for the injury he experienced through no fault of his

own. See id.
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Another virtue of the compelled self-publication doctrine lies in its
implicit acknowledgement of the dual realities faced by discharged
employees. The first is that as a practical matter, not to mention as
a legal matter, they must seek other employment. 285 When they do
so, they often will be asked by prospective employers to explain why
their previous employment ceased. The second reality is that disclosures of the former employers' false and defamatory statements of
reasons for the employment terminations will hinder their searches
for employment, regardless of whether such disclosures were by the
previous employers directly or by the discharged employees in response to questions from prospective employers. 286 In cases in which
the former employer's statement to the discharged employee was both
false and disparaging and the employee has been compelled to disclose
it to a prospective employer, the notion of fundamental fairness
points toward an elimination of the former employer's ability to
dispose of troublesome litigation by relying upon a technicality
concerning how publication occurred. If the previous employer is
allowed to do so in a case of compelled disclosure by the former
employee, the publication element may serve not only as a shield for
the previous employer but also as a sword by which he may cause
lasting damage to the discharged employee, should he choose to do
so, without incurring any liability. 8 7 The compelled self-publication
doctrine lessens such prospect.

285. The practical need of discharged employees to seek and obtain new
employment is self-evident. There may also be a legal need to do so. If the discharged
employee challenges his dismissal as unlawful in some sense and has failed to seek
other suitable employment, he becomes subject to an argument, by the former
employer, that he has failed to mitigate damages. See Polson v. Davis, 635 F.Supp.
1130, 1147 (D. Kan. 1986).
286. The dual realities mentioned in the text are obvious, but they neither
have been acknowledged nor adequately respected by defamation law's traditional
rule, see supra text accompanying notes 74-75, that the plaintiff's own communication to a third party cannot be actionable against the defendant.
287. Consider, for instance, a situation in which an employer wishes to inflict
lasting, though undeserved, damage upon an employee toward whom he possesses
bad feelings. Such employer discharges the employee, and in the course of doing so
expresses to such person certain purported reasons for termination whose underlying
implications are known by such employer to be false and grossly disparaging.
Prospective employers effectively require the discharged employee to disclose the
former employer's stated reasons for discharging him. When such disclosures are
made and the prospective employers learn of the former employer's expressed
reasons, they decide not to hire the applicant. Without the compelled self-publication
doctrine, the former employer would not be liable in a defamation action brought
by the discharged employee, because the discharged employee himself communicated
the offending statements to third parties. Nonrecognition of self-publication under
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Also among the strengths of the compelled self-publication rule is
its tendency to encourage and, at least with regard to discharged
28 8
employees, reward honesty and truthfulness in the workplace.
Recognition of the doctrine provides an added incentive, albeit a
negative one, for employers to be truthful in their statements to
employees concerning the reasons for their terminations. 2 9 More
significantly, allowing discharged employees to rely on the doctrine
keeps them from suffering an added penalty for being honest in
responding to prospective employers' questions concerning the rea29
sons for the termination of their previous employment. 0
Even though the compelled self-publication doctrine's virtues surpass its infirmities, courts must not approve the doctrine without
giving suitable attention to its proper components and certain other
measures that must accompany its adoption. The following section
will be devoted to analysis of such considerations.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE COMPELLED SELF-PUBLICATION DOCTRINE
A. Choosing and Applying the Doctrine's Components
When courts choose to allow defamation claims involving the
discharged employee's own communication of the former employer's
such circumstances would allow the former employer to inflict damages willfully
and not be held liable therefor in a defamation suit, despite his statements' damaging
character, his awareness that the plaintiff would be required to repeat such statements, his knowledge that the statements were false, and his ill will toward the
plaintiff. Although such extreme facts could give rise to an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim in favor of the plaintiff, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 7,
46, a defamation claim should be recognized as a matter of fundamental fairness.
288. The availability of the compelled self-publication doctrine should encourage applicants for employment to be truthful in response to inquiries by
prospective employers concerning the former employers' stated reasons for terminating the applicants' employment. Allowing discharged employees to rely on the
doctrine amounts to something of a reward for their having been truthful in
responding to prospective employers' questions of the sort referred to in the preceding
sentence. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn.
1986); Polson v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130, 1147 (D. Kan. 1986). In a sense,
employers obtain a "reward" for truthfulness, which takes the form of an escape
from defamation liability because of the rule that true statements do not give rise
to valid defamation claims. See supra text accompanying note 32.
289. Such negative incentive is the danger of defamation liability that may
attach to the making of false statements.
290. The ordinary "penalty" for a truthful response to such questions would
be the unfortunate result that the discharged employee-applicant would not be hired
by the prospective employer. The added penalty (absent recognition of the compelled
self-publication doctrine) would be that the discharged employee would have no
workable remedy against the former employer for his injury.
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statements, they should opt for the requirements as set forth in the
compelled self-publication test of cases like Lewis v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y.291 and McKinney v. County of Santa Clara,292 rather
than for the seemingly looser approach taken in other self-publication
cases.2 9 The Lewis-McKinney requirements, with their focus on
whether the discharged employee plaintiff effectively was compelled
to make the disclosure to third parties and whether such compulsion
was foreseeable to the former employer, 294 establish a stiffer standard
of applicability than does other cases' approach of examining only
whether it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff would
make the disclosure to a third party. 295 The compelled self-publication
test as set forth in Lewis and McKinney, is preferred because certain
disclosures by the plaintiff may not have been compelled but may
have been foreseeable to the defendant. 2 96 If plaintiffs' noncompelled
but foreseeable self-publications are held actionable, defendants'
liability would be stretched beyond what conceptually is justifiable,
and plaintiffs could feel encouraged to manufacture their own claims
by repeating the defendants' statements even though there was no
2 91
particular need to do so.
As an additional safeguard against misuse of the compelled selfpublication doctrine, courts should pay close attention to whether
the necessary compulsion truly existed under the facts. The focus of
the compulsion inquiry should go beyond determining whether the
discharged employee plaintiff needed to obtain new employment and
whether a prospective employer sought general information from the
plaintiff concerning his previous employment. In determining whether
there was the necessary compulsion, the jury must be given an
appropriate instruction requiring that the plaintiff have been compelled to disclose what the former employer stated to the plaintiff

291.
292.
293.

Lewis, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980).
See cases discussed in supra text accompanying notes 140-52, 163-70, 203-

38.
294. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886, 888; McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 796,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50, 166, 212-13.
296. For instance, it may be foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff
would repeat, to his relatives or friends, the defendant's statements. It is questionable, however, whether there was any particular compulsion for the repetition to
such persons.
297. The compulsion requirement, therefore, serves as a triggering element
that adequately protects the interests of plaintiffs and simultaneously guards against
plaintiffs' possible abuse of the self-publication theory.
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as the reason for his termination. For instance, if the subject of the
plaintiff's previous employment was addressed in an employment
interview but the prospective employer's questions and comments did
not call for the plaintiff to disclose what the former employer had
stated to him, the mere fact that the plaintiff's former employment
was discussed would not give rise to a conclusion that the necessary
compulsion existed. A close analysis of the facts is called for, rather
than an assumption that in an employment application or interview
29
setting, there must have been compulsion to disclose. 1
B.

The Need for Accompanying PrecautionaryMeasures

In addition to the need to achieve proper formulation and application of the compelled self-publication doctrine's components, certain precautionary measures should accompany the adoption of the
doctrine. Such measures will be discussed in the immediately following paragraphs. As a preface to such discussion, however, it should
be noted that some of the measures to be proposed are consistent
with developments in the constitutional law of defamation, whose
unclear scope makes uncertain the extent to which the usual employment discharge based defamation suit is affected by first amendmentmandated requirements. 2 99 Plausible arguments may be made to the
effect that even with regard to the ordinary employment termination
setting, at least some of the measures mentioned below are required
by the first amendment. 3 °° Assuming, however, that the proposals set
forth herein are not required as a matter of federal constitutional
law, they are offered as proposed modifications to the common law
of defamation. Regardless of whether they are adopted as a constitutional matter or as part of the common law, the suggested requirements are desirable because of their probable tendency to counteract,
at least partially, two undesirable prospects that would be created by
recognition of the compelled self-publication doctrine: (1.) the likelihood that a greater number of suits would be brought against
former employers; and, (2.) the corresponding likelihood that employers would decide to remain completely silent concerning the

298. In a jury case, proper instructions of course will be needed in order to
alert the jury to the importance of determining whether the compulsion to disclose
actually existed under the facts.
299. See supra notes 27-29.
300. See supra notes 26-29, 36-37.
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reasons for employment terminations, even as to the discharged
employees themselves.30 '
C.

A Proof of Falsity Requirement

The first of the suggested modifications is a broad one whose
scope encompasses the employment termination context and beyond.
Such modification involves an outright elimination of defamation
law's presumption that the offending statement was false. 0 2 Instead,
the plaintiff should be required to bear the burdens of proof and
persuasion on the critical question of whether the defendant's statement was false. 0 Such a requirement has been expressly recognized
as a constitutional matter with regard to defamation actions falling
into certain categories.) 4 Although the usual employment termination-based claim would not seem to fit within such categories, °5 the
Supreme Court has left open the possibility that a first amendmentbased proof of falsity burden could be placed upon plaintiffs in cases
other than those which already recognize such a burden.?° Even if
such .a rule were not thought to be required as a constitutional

301. For additional discussion of such undesirable prospects, see supra text
accompanying notes 250-61.
302. For discussion of the presumption of falsity, see supra text accompanying
notes 33-37. This article's proposed elimination of the presumption of falsity would
be particularly appropriate in the employment termination setting, for reasons to be
set forth in later text. See infra text accompanying notes 308-14. It would also be
appropriate with regard to nonemployment-related defamation actions from which
such presumption has not expressly been eradicated by the Supreme Court for
constitutional reasons. See infra notes 36-37.
303. The falsity question is critical because the defendant cannot be held liable
in a defamation action if his statement was not false. See supra text accompanying
note 32.
304. The categories of cases are those involving a public official or a public
figure as plaintiff, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) and those involving
a private figure plaintiff, if the private figure plaintiff case also involved a media
defendant and a statement having to do with a matter of public concern. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1559 (1986). See supra note 36.
305. See supra note 37.
306. InPhiladelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558 (1986), the
court's holding that the plaintiff must prove falsity was expressly limited to cases
involving private figure plaintiffs, media defendants, and statements of public
concern. Id. at 1559. The court also pointed out that it was not offering an opinion
on whether the same rule would apply in a case involving a nonmedia defendant,
because the facts of the case did not present that question. Id. at 1565 n.4. Also
subject to debate is the question whether such rule would apply to a private figure
plaintiff case in which the statement was not of public concern. See supra notes 3637.
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matter, it would nonetheless be a sensible addition to the common
law defamation. Requiring all defamation plaintiffs to prove falsity
would promote consistency in a body of law whose approach to the
falsity question has fallen far short of achieving consistency. 07 Additionally, such a rule is logical when considered alongside the notion
that plaintiffs should be expected to prove the basic elements of their
asserted causes of action. Because falsity is an essential element of
a defamation claim, plaintiffs, in such cases, should be expected to
prove it.
Aside from the reasons set forth in the preceding paragraph for
effecting an elimination of the presumption of falsity in all defamation actions regardless of type, there are three additional reasons
for requiring plaintiffs to prove falsity in defamation suits arising
out of the employment termination context. The first is that the
discharged employee plaintiff should ordinarily be in a good position
to adduce evidence bearing upon the falsity issue. 0 Such evidence
could consist, for instance, of the testimony of the plaintiff and
fellow employees, the admissions of the plaintiff's superiors, or
pertinent records of the employer.3 °9 The second additional reason
for such a proof of falsity rule, at least in the employment termination
setting, is that it amounts to a fair tradeoff for plaintiffs' newly
recognized ability to rely on the compelled self-publication doctrine.
If discharged employee plaintiffs are to be granted the benefit of
such doctrine, such benefit should carry a price, so as to make less
severe the doctrine's potentially harmful effects31 0 upon employers
and employment-related communication in general.311
The third additional reason for making the discharged employee
plaintiff prove falsity is one that courts relying thereon probably
would not want to acknowledge openly. Nevertheless, the reason
merits discussion. It draws upon the view, expressed by some ob-

307. The inconsistency stems from the common law's presumption of falsity
and the Supreme Court's chipping away at it without having eradicated it from all
cases. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37 and supra notes 36-37.
308. See Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness
and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 860-61 (1984).

309. The significance of such records may lie either in what they contain or
do not contain, depending upon the nature of the statement upon which the plaintiff's
claim is based.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 250-61.
311.

The question of whether the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving

falsity was not addressed in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d
876 (Minn. 1986) and the self-publication cases that preceded it.
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servers, that whenever an employment termination-related defamation
action gets to the jury, the defendant employer is at serious risk of

having a substantial verdict entered against

it.312

Such risk exists,

according to such observers, because of what they perceive as jurors'
tendencies to be sympathetic to discharged employees and hostile
toward the employers who have caused such persons to be out of
work. 313 These tendencies could cause jurors to side with the discharged employee regardless of the strength of the evidence or the
content of the court's instructions. To the extent such risk exists,
the proof of falsity rule proposed herein could serve as a further
31 4
means of balancing the scales.
D.

A Fault Requirement As Well As a Conditional Privilege

When it allowed the plaintiffs to rely upon the compelled selfpublication doctrine, the court in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y.3 15 recognized that the defendant former employer should be
entitled to a conditional privilege on the same basis that it would
have been, had it communicated the offending statements directly to
prospective employers of the plaintiffs.31 6 As the court noted in Lewis,
it would be illogical to allow the defendant a privilege in a case
involving the defendant's direct communication with a third party
and not to allow a privilege in a case in which the defendant
communicated only with the plaintiff and the plaintiff actually effected the necessary publication to a third party.31 7 The Lewis court
also took the sensible position that a suitable privilege must be
granted to employers in compelled self-publication cases, in order to
lessen the likelihood that employers would refrain from communicating to anyone, the discharged employee included, the reason for
the termination of the employee.3 1 1 Other courts adopting the compelled self-publication doctrine should follow the lead of Lewis and

312. See Stricharchuk, supra note 10, at 31.
313. Id.; Middleton, supra note 10, at 31.
314. In other words, the proof of falsity rule proposed herein could serve as
an additional basis for the granting of defendant employers' motions for directed
verdicts or judgments notwithstanding the verdict. Assuming that jurors in employment termination-related defamation cases are inclined to abide by the court's
instructions, such proof of falsity rule would provide an additional basis for jury
verdicts in favor of defendant employers.
315. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
316. Id. at 889.
317. Id. at 889-90.
318. Id.at 890.
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extend the employer's conditional privilege to the compelled selfpublication setting in circumstances in which the employer, if he had
made the communication directly to the third party, would have been
entitled to such a privilege.
With the conditional privilege, the defendant former employer
would be insulated from liability even for a false and defamatory
statement unless he abused the privilege.31 9 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether making such privilege available in compelled selfpublication cases goes far enough to ameliorate the compelled selfpublication doctrine's perceived harmful effects of increasing the
amount of defamation litigation and discouraging employers from
revealing the reasons for employment terminations. Given the importance of maintaining open lines of communication concerning
employment-related matters, a defendant employer in a defamation
action based upon compelled self-publication should be granted not
only a conditional privilege, when appropriate, but also the protection
of a negligence standard with regard to his attempts to determine
the truth of his statement and his basis for believing the matter
asserted therein to be true.3 20 The discharged employee should be
expected to prove that the defendant former employer failed to use
reasonable care to ascertain the truth or falsity of the offending
statement before making it. If the plaintiff is unable to prove such
negligence on the part of the defendant, there would be no need to
reach the questions whether the defendant was entitled to a privilege
and, if so, whether the privilege was abused.
The negligence standard just proposed (or a fault requirement at
least as significant in degree) may be required as a matter of federal
constitutional law, but the uncertain reach of the United States
Supreme Court's defamation decisions leaves unresolved the question
of whether such a first amendment mandated fault requirement
attaches to the usual employment termination-based defamation action.3 21 Even if such a fault standard is not required by the consti319. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
320. See Middleton, supra note 10, at 31 (quoting Professor Rodney Smolla).
The same reasoning may apply to the employment termination-related defamation
suit that does not involve a compelled self-publication claim, but it is more forceful
in the self-publication context, because of the need to take steps that will encourage
employers to continue communicating with discharged employees concerning the
reasons for their terminations from employment.
321. See supra notes 26-28. A basic fault requirement of negligence may
coexist with the allowance of a conditional privilege to the defendant, if what is
necessary to defeat the privilege is proof of something different from or more severe
than negligence. See Watkins & Schwartz, Gertz and the Common Law of Defamation: Of Fault, Nonmedia Defendants, and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 823, 880.
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tution, the interests that stand to be affected 22 by the compelled selfpublication doctrine and the recent upsurge in employment terminated
related defamation litigation are such that the proposed negligence
standard should be made part of the common law applicable to these
cases.
An argument that may be raised against the imposition of a
negligence standard, in addition to the allowance of a conditional
privilege, is that the negligence standard does nothing for employers
that the protection of the conditional privilege does not already do.
This argument will ring true in some and perhaps most, but not all,
employment termination-based defamation suits.3 23 If the former
employer's conditional privilege in a compelled self-publication case
is tied to whether or not the former employer would have been
entitled to such a privilege if he had stated directly to the third party
what the plaintiff disclosed to such third party, there may be instances
in which the court would deny the former employer a conditional
privilege. 2 4 Although cases in which no conditional privilege is al322. Such interests are, as previously noted; that of avoiding an excessive
amount employment termination-related defamation litigation and that of maintaining a free flow of employment-related information. See supra text accompanying
note 320.
323. Indeed, with the frequent applicability of the conditional privilege in the
employment setting, see supra text accompanying notes 50-55, the question whether
the defendant was negligent often would be made moot by the existence of the
privilege, which would protect the defendant from liability even if the defendant
had been negligent. If the question becomes whether the defendant forfeited the
protection of the conditional privilege by abusing it and the applicable standard for
abuse under state law is whether the defendant made the offending statement with
actual malice, the negligence inquiry would be overshadowed by the actual malice
inquiry. Such overshadowing would take place because actual malice is more serious,
in terms of whether the defendant acted wrongfully, than is negligence. See infra
notes 333-34. However, if the circumstances of the case are such that a conditional
privilege would not attach to the situation, or if common law malice is the applicable
standard for abuse of a conditional privilege under state law, a basic fault requirement of at least negligence would provide an important and independent protection
for the defendant. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26.
324. If the discharged employee's communication, though effectively compelled, was to a third party other than a prospective employer, it is conceivable that
a court could deny the former employer the protection of a conditional privilege on
the theory that the former employer would not have been entitled to a conditional
privilege if he had communicated the information directly to the third party. For
instance, the discharged employee's compelled communication may have been to a
creditor or a business associate or agent unconnected with the former employer.
Although, depending upon the facts, one could argue that the former employer
should have a conditional privilege even in such situations because of the general
rules about what triggers a conditional privilege, see supra text accompanying notes
51-53, the circumstances could be such that some courts would deny the former
employer the privilege.
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lowed would seem to be the exception rather than the rule, employers
not granted the privilege would be held strictly liable,3 25 unless the
court required a negligence standard of the sort described above.
Similarly, even if the former employer is allowed a conditional
privilege, some states adhere to the notion that a conditional privilege
is lost if the holder of the privilege acted with common law malice,
in the sense of ill will or spite motives.126 Without a negligence
standard in these states, a former employer who had a reasonable
basis for believing the truth of his statement about the discharged
employee may be held liable if he possessed ill will toward the person.
The interest in maintaining free, open, and honest communication
concerning employment matters would be better served by a set of
rules whose focus, for liability purposes, is primarily on employers
who do not display the necessary degree of care concerning ascertainment of the truth of their statements, and only secondarily on
employers who possess ill will toward the employee who is the subject
of the statements. The employers to be held liable, therefore, are
those who: (1.) fail to use reasonable care to ascertain the truth of
their statements before making them and are not granted the benefit
of a conditional privilege; and, (2.) otherwise would be entitled to a
conditional privilege but forfeit it by deliberately lying or recklessly
3 27
making false statements about former employees.
If a basic fault requirement of at least negligence is recognized
with regard to employment termination-based defamation cases, it
will become particularly important to clarify what constitutes abuse
of the conditional privilege. It is clear that in such event, contrary
to what courts in some states have held,3 28 the defendant's negligence
(in the sense of failing to take reasonable care to determine the truth)

325. Because the common law of defamation has not called for a basic fault
requirement, it fairly may be characterized as a strict liability approach. See supra
text accompanying note 45.
326. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 61.
327. The first category noted would cover employers who, having been neg-

ligent with regard to their steps to determine the truth, either made their statements
in a situation to which no conditional privilege could have attached, or would have

been entitled to such a privilege but made the false statement out of ill will toward
the employee who was the subject of the statements and therefore (assuming state
law so provided) lost the protection of the privilege. The second category noted

would pertain to employers who acted with actual malice and thus displayed a
degree of culpability sufficient not only to satisfy the basic fault requirement but
also to effect a forfeiture of the protection of the conditional privilege. See infra

note 333.
328.

See supra text accompanying note 65.
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cannot constitute abuse of the privilege. The conditional privilege
would have no significance for the defendant employer if the plaintiff's proof of the basic fault requirement of negligence also would
29
constitute proof sufficient to defeat the privilege.
With regard to the appropriate standard for abuse of the conditional privilege, the court in Lewis concluded that common law
malice (ill will and the like) was the appropriate standard.3 30 A
substantial case may be made for the proposition that the actual
malice standard of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth, as developed in the United States Supreme Court's decisions
dealing with the constitutional aspects of defamation,' is the preferable standard because exclusive use of it would minimize the danger
of confusion between the two sorts of malice.33 2 Notwithstanding the
possibility of confusion concerning the two sorts of malice, an
approach that would effect a better balance between the conflicting
interests of the parties in employment discharge-based defamation
litigation would be to allow plaintiffs to defeat the defendant's
conditional privilege either by proving actual malice or by proving
common law malice. Suitable and meaningful jury instructions explaining the terms obviously would be necessary to minimize the
likelihood of confusion.
Under the approach just suggested, if the plaintiff is able to prove
either the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of his statement or
his reckless disregard for the truth, such proof of actual malice would
serve the dual purposes of satisfying the basic fault requirement
proposed above333 and causing a forfeiture of the defendant's conditional privilege. Nevertheless, to allow the discharged employee
plaintiff to defeat the conditional privilege only by proof of actual
malice would be to impose an unreasonably difficult burden upon
the plaintiff. The actual malice standard is the stiffest standard

329. See Smolla, supra note 2, at 79; Watkins & Schwartz, supra note 321,
at 868-69.
330. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 891.
331. See supra notes 25-28.
332. See Smolla, supra note 2, at 79-80.
333. By proving actual malice, which consists of knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth, the plaintiff necessarily would have proved that the
defendant possessed culpability of a degree even greater than what is contemplated
by the suggested fault standard of negligence in the sense of failing to take reasonable
steps to ascertain the truth. See supra note 26. Therefore, as a common-sense matter,
the plaintiff who proves actual malice where negligence is the basic standard must
be regarded not merely as having met the minimum fault standard but as having
gone well beyond it.
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imposed in defamation law.33 4 In the interest of providing a workable
remedy to the injured party, the discharged employee plaintiff should
be allowed the alternative means of overcoming the defendant's
conditional privilege by proof of the defendant's common law malice.
It should be remembered, however, that in such event, the plaintiff
still would not be able to prevail in the suit unless he or she also
has presented proof sufficient to satisfy the basic fault requirement
of negligence proposed earlier.335
E.

An Alteration of the Rules Governing Recoverable Damages

The standards governing recoverable damages are the subject of
the final suggestions to be made herein concerning modifications that
should accompany the adoption of the compelled self-publication
doctrine. In the Lewis decision, the court recognized that with regard
to compelled self-publication cases, there was a need for controls on
what damages would be recoverable. The court's concern was that
without some alteration of the damages rules, compelled self-publication cases could become too attractive to discharged employees
and too burdensome on former employers.33 6 In the view of the
Lewis court, the proper alteration of the damages rules was to
eliminate the availability of punitive damages in compelled self33 7
publication cases.
Although the Lewis court voiced a legitimate concern as the basis
for its decision to alter the damages rules for compelled self-publication cases, its choice of a means to alleviate such concern swept
too far and largely in the wrong direction. Instead of an outright
elimination of the possibility of punitive damages in compelled selfpublication cases, a preferable approach would involve the following

334. Defamation law's approaches to the imposition of liability upon defendants may be likened to a spectrum. At one extreme is the common law's approach
of liability without fault. See supra text accompanying note 45. At the other extreme
is the requirement of proof of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth), either as a constitutional matter or as necessary to defeat
the common law conditional privilege. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28,
63-64. The approach of requiring proof of negligence (failure to take reasonable
care to ascertain the truth), see supra note 26 and supra text accompanying notes
320-27, would fall somewhere between the two extremes.
335. This would mean that if the former employer used reasonable care to
determine the accuracy of his statement and had a reasonable basis for believing it
to be true, the former employer would not be liable even though the statement was
false and the former employer possessed ill feelings toward the discharged employee.
336. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 892.

337.

Id.
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two components: first, a preservation of the possibility of punitive
damages in some compelled self-publication cases, along with a clear
restriction on the circumstances in which such damages may be
allowed; and second, an elimination of the possibility of presumed
33s
damages in compelled self-publication cases.
The Lewis decision's elimination of the prospect of punitive damages in all compelled self-publication cases goes farther than is
necessary or desirable in that it would prohibit the discharged employee from recovering punitive damages even where statements were
made by employers with the knowledge that they were false in their
literal content or underlying implication. Because of the need to
discourage the use of a deliberate lie, punitive damages still should
be available in compelled self-publication cases if the plaintiff proves
that the defendant's statement was made with actual malice, i.e.,
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth
or falsity.33 9 A punitive damages rule tied to such a stiff standard of
proof seems unlikely to provide any greater deterrent to employerinitiated communications with discharged employees than the basic
compelled self-publication doctrine itself already does. 4° In addition,
it is improbable that the availability of punitive damages would make
plaintiffs feel especially encouraged to bring compelled self-publication suits in order to seek a punitive damages windfall, if the
availability of punitive damages is tied to whether the plaintiff can
prove actual malice.141 Accompanying such restriction on the avail-

338. The previously noted upsurge in employment termination-based defamation litigation, see supra text accompanying notes 10-11 and supra note 252, could
be used to justify application of such modifications to employment-connected
defamation suits in which no self-publication issue is present.
339. The assertion in the text should be subject to a qualification, however,
that no punitive damages may be awarded unless the plaintiff has proved special
damages in accordance with the rules to be suggested in infra text accompanying
notes 342-49. Such a qualification is desirable for the purpose of keeping compelled
self publication cases from becoming too attractive to plaintiffs, as well as for the
purpose of encouraging employers to continue communicating with discharged
employees concerning the reasons for their terminations from employment.
340. It must be admitted that the Lewis approach of completely eliminating
the prospect of punitive damages in a compelled self-publication case, see supra text
accompanying notes 336-37, could encourge employer-employee communication more
than this article's suggested approach of allowing punitive damages but only in quite
restricted circumstances. Nevertheless, whatever greater encouragement in that regard
is offered by Lewis probably is not significantly greater, and in any event is not
justified when one considers such approach's effect of rendering the punitive damages
sanction inapplicable even in the case of the deliberate lie.
341. Insofar as the foregoing proposal would restrict the availability of punitive
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ability of punitive damages in the compelled self-publication setting
should be an elimination of the common law concept of presumed
damages.3 42 The availability of presumed damages, always something
of an oddity in tort law,3 43 seems particularly inappropriate in a
compelled self-publication case, where the defendant is being held
responsible for a communication he himself did not make. If the
only publication was the plaintiff's own communication to a third
party and the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant legally accountable
therefore, it would not be unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to
prove that he in fact was damaged as a result of such disclosure to
a third party. That the plaintiff's self-publication was compelled

damages to cases in which the defendant made the defamatory statement with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth such proposal is
consistent with the approach taken to the punitive damages question by the United
States Supreme Court in most of its decisions dealing with the constitutional aspects
of defamation. See supra notes 25, 26. As has been noted previously, it is uncertain
to what extent such constitutional considerations apply in the context of the usual
employment termination-related defamation suit, largely because such a case probably
would not involve a matter of public concern and to some degree because such a
case would not involve a media defendant. See supra notes 27-28. The court has
indicated, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss. Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985), that punitive damages may be awarded in a private figure plaintiff case in
which actual malice was not proved, if the statement at issue pertained to a matter
of only private concern. Id. at 751, 761, 763. Therefore, it may be that proof of
actual malice as a precondition to allowance of punitive damages may not be
required as a constitutional matter in the ordinary employment discharge-based
defamation suit, but that does not mean such a requirment cannot be adopted as
part of the common law of defamation.
342. For discussion of such common law concept, see supra text accompanying
notes 38-44.
343. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). In Gertz, the
Supreme Court dealt with this oddity by ruling that presumed and punitive damages
not be awarded unless the plaintiff proved actual malice, and that if the plaintiff
proved only the lesser standard of fault required elsewhere in the opinion, see supra
note 26, the plaintiff must prove "actual injury." 418 U.S. at 349. The Court went
on to indicate that "actual injury" encompasses not only out-of pocket loss but
also loss of standing in the community, emotional distress, and humiliation. Id. at
350. It never has been clear whether Gertz applies in cases involving nonmedia
defendants. Now, as a result of the Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), it appears that Gertz's requirement
of proof of actual malice as a precondition to an award of presumed damages does
not apply if the case involved a private figure plaintiff and a statement of only
private concern. See id. at 751, 761, 763. Whatever the present status of the
constitutional approach to presumed damages and what a plaintiff must prove in
order to be entitled to them, a prohibition on presumed damages in a compelled
self-publication case would be a sound development as a matter of common law.
For discussion of the reasons for such a prohibition, see infra text accompanying
notes 344-45.
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under the circumstances does not automatically mean that the plaintiff was damaged as a result of it. The plaintiff should be expected
to make such connection by means of suitable proof. A requirement
that the plaintiff do so seems better calculated, than does the Lewis
elimination of the punitive damages possibility, 34 to keep the compelled self-publication doctrine from appearing too attractive to dis45
charged employees and too burdensome on former employers.1
If presumed damages are eliminated from compelled self-publication cases, a question then arises concerning what kind of damages
must be proven by the plaintiff if he is to prevail in such a suit.
The plaintiff should be expected to prove either special damages in
the form of economic loss 346 as the result of the disclosure to the
third party, or other damage taking the form of the plaintiff's loss
of reputation in the eyes of a third party. Therefore, in the usual
compelled self-publication case involving a discharged employee plaintiff who has disclosed to a prospective employer what the former
employer stated, the plaintiff would be expected to prove facts
justifying a conclusion that he was not hired by the prospective
employer as a result of such disclosure. Alternatively, the plaintiff
could prove facts tending to show that even if he was not hired for
reasons other than what he disclosed, he was injured because the47
prospective employer acquired an unfavorable opinion about him.
Because of the practical difficulty of proving that the content of the
compelled disclosure was the sole reason the plaintiff was not hired
by the prospective employer, the plaintiff should be regarded as
having satisfied his burden of proving damages if the evidence
indicates that the content of the disclosure was among the factors
relied upon by the prospective employer in the decision not to hire

344. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 892.
345. In fairness to the Lewis court, it should be noted that the plaintiffs in
the case probably had proved special damages. The evidence apparently demonstrated
a connection between their compelled disclosures to prospective employers and such
employers' decisions not to hire them. See id. at 882. Given what the record showed,
therefore, the court may not have felt it necessary or appropriate to deal with the
subject of presumed damages.
346. The concept of special damages is similar to what the common law has
traditionally required proof of in slander cases not involving slander per se. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
347. In this event, however, the plaintiff's damages would be only for his loss
of standing in the eyes of a third party and its agents, not for any presumed loss
of standing or reputation in society in general. Not to limit the loss of reputation
damages in this manner would be to effect a return to the presumed damages
approach.
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the plaintiff.148 Proof of the specific dollar amount of such a loss
49
should not be required.1
In a compelled self-publication case, the plaintiff who has satisfied
the proof of damages burden just mentioned also should be allowed
to recover damages based upon his own humiliation and emotional
distress which he proves to have resulted from the compelled disclosure. However, mere proof of humiliation or emotional distress,
unaccompanied by proof of the damages discussed in the preceding
paragraph, should not be sufficient to enable the plaintiff to discharge
his burden of proving damages in a compelled self-publication case.350
The proof of damages approach proposed herein thus falls somewhere
between the special damages concept adhered to by the common law
in slander cases351 and the "actual injury" concept developed by the
Supreme Court in cases dealing with the constitutional aspects of
52
defamation.
The foregoing suggestions for modifications to the presumed and
punitive damages rules would exact a price, but not too severe, for
plaintiffs to pay if they wish to rely on the compelled self-publication
doctrine. Such modifications would adequately protect the rights of
discharged employees trying to obtain compensation for the injury
done to them, without being so harsh as to discourage employers
from communicating with employees concerning the reasons for their
terminations from employment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Legitimate concerns exist with regard to the compelled self-publication doctrine's probable tendencies to increase the amount of
employment-connected defamation litigation and to discourage em-

348. There is a danger, of course, that to the extent there is a "fraternity"
of employers, a prospective employer might not want to help a rejected applicant
pin defamation liability on a former employer. Therefore, some prospective employers may not be overly willing to testify on behalf of plaintiffs. See Middleton,
supra note 10, at 30. Nevertheless, even with a less than cooperative prospective
employer as a witness, the plaintiff should be able to adduce an acknowledgement
that the content of the disclosure was one of the factors relied upon in the making
of the decision not to hire the plaintiff, if in fact that was the case.
349. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
350. The reason for this proposal is that it is in keeping with the notion that
the essence of a defamation action is the loss of reputation. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 6, 111, at 771. Personal humiliation and emotional distress,
without more, do not translate into a loss of reputation.
351. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 343.
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ployers from informing discharged employees of the reasons for their
employment terminations. Nevertheless, the doctrine merits the approval of courts faced with having to decide whether to allow its use
in employment termination-related defamation cases. Where the discharged employee establishes the necessary elements of compulsion
and foreseeability, he should be entitled to proceed toward a resolution of his defamation claim on the basis of meaningful issues,
instead of having his claim be subject to dismissal because of what
amounts, in such a case, to a publication technicality.
Recognition of the compelled self-publication doctrine should not
take place, however, without the adoption of accompanying safeguards taking the previously discussed forms of proof of falsity,
proof of fault, and proof of damages requirements. In addition, the
former employer must be allowed a conditional privilege on the same
basis to which he would have been entitled to such a privilege if the
case had been a standard defamation suit rather than one of the
compelled self-publication variety. If the compelled self-publication
doctrine is adopted along with these additional measures, the injured
employee would be afforded the prospect of an adequate remedy for
the loss of his "purest treasure," 3'53 and neither employers nor the
process of employment-related communication would suffer undue
harm.

353.

See W. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, line 177.

